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Executive Summary 
Hungary, with its population of 10 million (2% of the EU-27 total) is a medium-sized EU 
member state. Its GDP was 1.26% of the EU-27 total in 2010. As for economic 
development, measured by GDP per capita (in PPS), the country ranked 22 in the EU-27 
in 2010, with 63.52% of the EU-27 average (all data from Eurostat, or calculations based 
on those data, unless otherwise indicated) 
The Hungarian GERD was oscillating between 0.9-1.0% of the GDP in 2001-2008, 
increased to 1.17% in 2009, and then stayed at that level (1.16%) in 2010. The share of 
FTE researchers in total employment increased from 0.53% in 2009 to 0.56% in 2010. 
Businesses have maintained their position as the largest employer of (FTE) researchers 
since 2006, reaching 48.1% in 2010, and had the biggest share in performing GERD 
(59.8%), too. Private R&D and innovation efforts are conducted to a disproportionately 
large extent by large, mainly foreign-owned firms in 2-3 sectors. BERD increased 
considerably – by 9.7% in 2009, and 10.27% in 2010 – and thus the BERD/GERD ratio 
jumped from 52.57% in 2008 to 59.81% in 2010, approaching the EU-27 average 
(61.51%). This increase was financed mainly by public and foreign funds.  
The higher education sector performed 19.9% of the Hungarian GERD in 2010. The 
weight of this sector was 28.3% in 2009 in the employment of FTE researchers. The 
government sector’s share was 23.6% in 2010 in the total number of FTE researchers. 
(CSO) 
Given severe cuts in government funding to support RTDI activities since June 2010, (i) 
no new STI policy schemes have been introduced since mid-2010; and (ii) the balance of 
funding has shifted significantly towards EU sources as the largest STI policy support 
schemes are co-financed by the EU Structural Funds. Hungary is squeezed in a 
‘nutcracker’ formed by advanced countries, on the one hand, and dynamic 
industrialising countries, on the other. The former ones are capable of controlling 
international production networks and markets via new technologies, financial muscles, 
and superior business models, while the latter ones are characterised by extremely low 
wages and highly disciplined work forces. To escape from this trap both technological 
and non-technological innovations would be needed to raise productivity and find new 
markets. Yet, Hungary is a ‘moderate innovator’, that is, belongs to a group of countries 
characterised by an overall innovation performance below that of the EU-27. 
To underpin an innovation-based ‘escape’ strategy, five main challenges, which 
constitute bottlenecks for the innovation system as a whole, have been identified in this 
report. The first two ones can be understood as symptoms, which are important enough 
to consider them on their own; the third is an ‘early warning’ signal; while the last two 
are not only important symptoms, but also major reasons to be considered when 
explaining poor performance. 
 Low level of innovation activities, especially that of the SMEs: only one-fifth of 
enterprises introduce product or process innovations in Hungary, with no major 
change since 2002; 16.8% of SMEs introduced product or process innovations in 
2006-2008, that is, 49% of the EU-27 average 
 Low occurrence of co-operation in innovation activities among key actors: 6.5% of 
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innovative firms reported any form of co-operation with Hungarian PROs; 7.1% of 
SMEs were engaged in innovation collaboration with other partners in 2006-2008, 
while the EU average was 11.2% 
 Insufficient quantity of human resources for R&D and innovation is forecast by 
2015 
 Unfavorable framework conditions for innovation, especially unpredictable 
business environment, high administrative and tax burden, competition not 
conducive to innovation 
 Shortcomings in STI policy: lack of political commitment; instability; shortfalls in 
implementation; and slow, insufficiently informed policy learning processes  
The Government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013) defines six priorities: (i) 
expand business R&D; (ii) establish internationally recognised RTDI centres and 
research universities; (iii) enhance regional RTDI capacities; (iv) establish a knowledge 
market; (v) invest in large scientific facilities; (vi) increase R&D expenditures, especially 
BERD. The STI policy support schemes in place have further objectives, too, and on the 
whole those objectives seem to be appropriate. 
There have been no major changes in terms of the main target groups of STI policy 
measures over the last three years: some schemes provide support for individual firms, 
while others put the emphasis on industry-academia co-operation or setting up 
accredited innovation clusters, and innovation activities by the members of these 
clusters. The balance between grants, loans, and non-direct funding measures has not 
changed, either. 
The government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013) stresses the need to align 
the national and EU STI policy goals. Thus, while the national STI policy mix is not 
aligned with the specific ERA pillars and objectives in an explicit, purposeful way, there 
is no major tension between the national policy goals and the ERA initiatives, either. 
Two main reasons of the poor innovation performance have been identified by 
independent analysts. One of these points outside the narrowly defined STI policy 
domain: the framework conditions for innovations influence firms’ behaviour with such 
a power that STI policy schemes cannot offer strong enough incentives to overrule those 
unfavourable effects. Thus, major policy efforts are needed to create favourable 
framework conditions, notably a stable macroeconomic environment; endurable 
administrative and tax burdens on firms; strong demand for new products; a sufficient 
supply of skilled people for RTDI projects; appropriate regulations and standards; 
effective IPR policies; etc. Further, policies affecting these conditions need to be aligned 
with STI policy efforts to make a difference. 
The second set of factors can be grouped together as shortcomings in policy-making, 
including lack of political commitment. R&D and innovation needs to be perceived by 
politicians as a major contributor to socio-economic development, as opposed to the 
current – although implicit – understanding, when it is taken as a burden on the budget, 
and thus becoming the first ‘victim’ when budget problems must be solved. 
Frequent changes in the structure of the STI policy governance sub-system has lead to 
organisational instability, which, in turn, affects negatively policy formation and 
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implementation as it hampers organisational learning and imposes unnecessary 
burdens on RTDI performers, too. Hence, this sub-system needs to be stabilised. 
Combining these explanatory factors, there seems to be no ‘panacea’ or a simple ‘quick 
fix’ to improve RTDI performance. Conscious co-ordination of major economic and STI 
policies is needed, guided by an overarching socio-economic development strategy. 
Foresight processes would be useful to underpin these strategies. These dialogues can 
also highlight how RTDI processes – advanced by appropriate STI policies – can 
contribute to overall socio-economic development. Policies affecting RTDI processes and 
performance need also to be orchestrated. Up-to-date decision-preparatory methods – 
most notably thorough analyses of innovation performance, combining census, R&D and 
innovation data; evaluation of individual policy measures, as well as that of the policy 
mix as a whole; and technology assessment – should be relied upon when devising and 
implementing STI policy measures, also assisted by recurring consultations with the 
major actors of the national innovation system. 
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1 Introduction 
Hungary, with its population of 10 million (2% of the EU-27 total) is a medium-sized EU 
member state. Its GDP was 1.26% of the EU-27 total in 2010 (fluctuating between 1.25-
1.30% in 2004-2010).1 As for economic development, measured by GDP per capita (in 
PPS), the country ranked 22 in the EU-27 in 2010, with 63.52% of the EU-27 average. In 
comparison with the EU-27 average, the Hungarian GDP grew slightly faster in 2008 
(0.9% vs. 0.3%), the contraction was more dramatic in 2009 (-6.8% vs. -4.3%), the 
recovery was slower in 2010 (1.3% vs. 1.9%), and the Eurostat forecast slower growth 
for 2011, too (1.4% vs. 1.6%). 
The Hungarian GERD was fluctuating between 0.9-1.0% of the GDP in 2001-2008, 
increased to 1.17% in 2009, and then stayed at that level (1.16%) in 2010. With these 
slightly increased efforts, Hungary still devotes significantly fewer resources to R&D 
than the EU-27 average: the GERD/GDP ratio was 58% of the EU-27 average in 2010. 
The share of FTE researchers in total employment increased from 0.53% in 2009 to 
0.56% in 2010, while the share of all FTE R&D employees did so from 0.79% to 0.83% in 
the same period. As for scientific output, the number of books and book chapters by 
Hungarian researchers grew by 9.4% in 2010 (the ones published in Hungarian by 8.8%, 
while that of published in foreign languages by 11.1%). The total number of articles 
decreased by 1.4%, but that of published in foreign languages increased by 8.8%. There 
are significant differences by sectors: higher education staff members are the most 
productive (on average 108 books and 331 articles by 100 FTE researchers), followed 
by researchers employed in the government sector (58 books and 158 articles by 100 
FTE researchers), and researchers working for businesses (2 books and 137 articles by 
100 FTE researchers). (KSH, 2011, Table 24) 
In international comparison Hungarian scientific output, ranked 35 in terms of 
publications recorded in Scopus in 1996-2007, and 24 in terms of citations in the same 
period. Researchers working in physics and astronomy; pharmacology, toxicology and 
pharmaceutics; earth and planetary sciences; and chemical engineering outperformed 
the Hungarian average both in terms of share of Hungarian publications in total 
publications, and the number of citations relative to the world average of citations in a 
given research field. (Schubert, 2009) 
Cost-benefit analysis, conducted for the period of 1996-2005, relying on Web of Science 
and OECD data, shows that Hungarian researchers are fairly productive in terms of 
scientific output. The number of papers per researcher is close to the EU25 average 
(90.8%), while funding is much lower: 56.7% of EU25 R&D spending per publications2 
(Tolnai, 2006) 
The poor performance in producing directly exploitable knowledge has been often 
identified as the major weakness of the research system. The number of patent 
applications, community designs and trademarks per billion GDP (in PPS €) are 37.5-
60.0% of the corresponding EU averages, but some of these indicators show a modest 
improvement3 (IUS 2010). However, at least two arguments should be recalled here as 
                                                        
1
 The report follows the template developed for the 2011 ERAWATCH country reports. It draws on the 
most recent Eurostat and Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) data, as well as on previous 
ERAWATCH and TrendChart country reports (Havas, 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, and 2011c). 
2
 Funding data have been taken from the OECD in PPS $. 
3
 Co-patenting with foreign inventors seems to be an important phenomenon in Central and Eastern 
European countries. (Goldberg et al, 2008) Data are not readily available to establish how pertinent 
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to why one should interpret these figures with a pinch of salt. First, when assessing the 
performance of a NIS in general, one should bear in mind that a wide array of other 
means can be – and indeed, are – utilised by firms to protect intellectual property, many 
of which are not captured by measurable or readily available indicators.4    Moreover, 
propensity to patenting is highly varied across sectors, and hence the sectoral 
distribution of a national economy might heavily influence the intensity of patenting 
activities. Thus, a low level of patenting activities does not necessarily indicate that 
researchers are not capable of producing exploitable knowledge, or a poor innovation 
performance5  Second, concerning specifically a catching up economy and its NIS, at that 
stage of development it might not be a meaningful (or feasible) target at all to produce 
as many patentable R&D results as possible. It seems to be more relevant to concentrate 
on (a) fostering the diffusion of knowledge and all forms of innovation; and (b) 
enhancing learning capabilities for a more efficient absorption and exploitation of new 
knowledge, wherever it is produced. These activities, contrary to widely held beliefs, still 
require fairly developed R&D and innovation skills, in order to identify the most suitable 
pieces and types of knowledge to be acquired (often imported), and ‘assemble’ those in 
an appropriate way, suited to the new context.6  
Manufacturing industries accounted for 21.6% of the GDP in 2008, declining to 20.1% in 
2009 (when the GDP contracted by 6.8%, as Hungary, being a small, open, export-
oriented economy, was hit hard by the global financial and economic crisis), and then 
this share increased to 22.3% in 2010. Five branches accounted for 59% of the total 
manufacturing value added in 2009, four of which  – like most manufacturing branches 
in Hungary – are dominated by foreign firms. (Table 1) 
Table 1: Major sectors of manufacturing industry, 2009 
 Share in manufacturing 
value added (%) 
Share of value added produced 
by foreign firms (%) 
Transport equipment 14.5 94.4 
Machinery and equipment 13.3 25.6 
Food products, beverages and 
tobacco products 
12.8 48.7 
Rubber and plastics products, and 
other non-metallic mineral products 
9.4 67.3 
Computer, electronic and optical 
products 
9.0 93.5 
Source: Author's calculation based on KSH data 
Given these two factors – sectoral composition of the economy and the dominant weight 
of foreign firms – demand for either R&D or other types of knowledge is moderate in 
Hungary: most Hungarian manufacturing firms perform relatively simple assembly 
                                                                                                                                                                             
this phenomenon in Hungary. 
4
 CIS results compellingly confirm this argument. 
5
 This, of course, is not to suggest that the Hungarian NIS performs astoundingly, in spite of the 
picture shown in the mirror of patenting activities. 
6
 In other words, adoption always requires adaptation, too, and thus it is a gross simplification to speak 
of ‘imported’ innovations (assuming that no local RTDI efforts and knowledge are needed by those 
firms introducing these types of innovations). 
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activities, producing goods that are traded inside big multinational automotive and 
electronics groups or global production networks. From a different angle, the OECD 
classification of sectors by their R&D intensity can be rather misleading from a policy 
point of view, given the significant deviation between the weight of ‘high-tech’ sectors in 
the Hungarian economic structure and their low knowledge-intensity.7  
Hungary has all the major elements of a potentially successful national innovation 
system (NIS), and yet, its performance is 'moderate'.8 The most important actors are 
listed below. 
The Education, Science, and Research Committee, together with the Economic and 
Informatics Committee of the Parliament are the highest-level political bodies in the 
field of STI policy. 
The National Research, Innovation and Science Policy Council, chaired by a deputy 
prime minister, co-chaired by the president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, has 
the mandate to co-ordinate governmental STI policy decisions. The members include 
three ministers with key responsibilities in devising STI policies, that is, the politicians 
heading the Ministry of National Development, the Ministry for National Economy, and 
the Ministry of National Resources. 
In spite of the mandate of the NKITT, several major STI policy decisions have been made 
without discussing those issues by the Council, e.g. changing the Law on the Research 
and Technological Innovation Fund: from 2012 companies are not entitled anymore to 
deduct either their intra-mural R&D expenditures or the amount they spend on 
commissioning publicly financed R&D units from the innovation levy.9 The President of 
the Hungarian Innovation Association (MISz) not only has criticised this very measure, 
but also protested against this practice of decision-making.10 
The National Innovation Office (NIH) is responsible for the government’s technology and 
innovation policy. Funds allocated through the Operational Programmes of the New 
Hungary Development Plan (2007-13) are managed by the National Development 
Agency (NFU). Both the NIH and NFU schemes are administered by an implementing 
organisation, called the Hungarian Economy Development Centre (MAG Zrt). 
Hungary is a unitary state with a centralised decision-making system with regard to major 
policy domains, including STI policies. Although the regional level has gradually gained 
more influence in policy-making in general, mainly due to external pressures (EU 
                                                        
7
 The Hungarian case is not an ‘exotic’ exception, on the contrary, these features characterise many 
other countries. (Srholec, 2006) The Hungarian data simply confirm a more general observation: to 
analyse the link between economic structures and the level of demand for knowledge one should take 
into account the actual activities performed, and especially the knowledge content of these activities. 
This more demanding task cannot be spared by simply applying the OECD classification of sectors. In 
brief, one should make a clear distinction between high-tech sectors and knowledge-intensive 
activities: firms belonging to a high-tech sector might conduct activities with a low knowledge content, 
and in several cases that is characteristic to the sector as a whole, too, while the opposite can be 
observed in many low-tech sectors in certain innovation systems. (Havas, 2006) 
8
 On some details of the moderate innovation performance, see sections 2-3, and on the apparent 
contradiction between having all the major elements of a potentially successful NIS in place and the 
moderate innovation performance, see e.g., Havas, 2011a, and Havas and Nyiri, 2007. 
9
 On the innovation levy, and more generally, the Law on the Research and Technological Innovation 
Fund, see previous ERAWATCH reports, as well as the relevant policy document template in the 
ERAWATCH database. 
10
 The President of MISz also stressed that stakeholders had not been consulted, either, prior to these 
major decisions. (meeting of the Presidium of MISz on 30 November 2011, 
http://www.innovacio.hu/ehirlevel/2011_22.html#top) 
COUNTRY REPORTS 2011: HUNGARY 
Page 9  
initiatives, guidelines, etc.), the central government’s role in STI policy-making is still 
dominant. 
All regions have the same status in terms of overall powers and responsibilities. The 
traditional sub-national levels of Hungarian policy-making were the 19 counties (plus 
Budapest) and the municipalities (local governments). With the exception of the largest 
municipalities, financing major RTDI activities would be unviable at a regional level. 
Local governments can influence these activities indirectly by operating local industrial 
parks (or co-operating with them), and offering various advantages (tax exemptions, 
favourable infrastructural conditions) to investments with a higher knowledge content 
and/ or more RTDI activities. With regard to STI policy-making, the regional and county 
levels have not gained a significant role, although the County Development Councils 
approve “county development programmes” with various STI policy measures, which 
predominantly follow the priorities of either the Economic Development Operational 
Programme (2007-2013) or the nationally funded STI policy measures. 
The EU Structural Funds regulations have demanded to create larger units compatible 
with the NUTS2 regions. As a result of the 1998 National Regional Development Concept, 
seven regions have been formed in Hungary, but mainly serving statistical-planning 
purposes, capable of administering the EU Structural Funds. Regions have neither 
democratically elected leaderships, nor any power to raise revenues. 
Businesses have maintained their position as the largest employer of (FTE) researchers 
since 2006, reaching 48.1% in 2010, and had the biggest share in performing GERD 
(59.8%), too. Both R&D and innovation activities of firms are highly skewed by size, 
ownership and sector. 
The largest number of research units is operated at higher education organisations 
(1,409 of the total 2,983 in 2010), but the average size of these units is rather small: 4.3 
FTE researchers. The HE sector performed 19.9% of the Hungarian GERD in 2010, while 
the EU-27 average was 24.2%. The weight of this sector was 28.3% in 2010 in the 
employment of FTE researchers. 
The government sector’s share was 23.6% in 2010 in the total number of (FTE) 
researchers. This figure reflects a high weight of PROs in the Hungarian NIS compared to 
the EU-27 average (12.5% in 2009). The most important player is the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (MTA). The MTA still has a substantial – albeit declining – weight in 
the Hungarian research system: its share was 13.3% in the total R&D personnel (FTE) 
and 11.6% of the GERD in 2010. 
Figure 1: The structure of the Hungarian National Innovation System (Dec 2011) 
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Source: compiled by the author 
Note: The institutes of Hungarian Academy of Sciences conduct research, and hence the dual role of HAS is 
indicated by a combination of colours in the figure. 
2 Structural challenges faced by the national system 
Hungary is squeezed in a ‘nutcracker’ formed by advanced countries, on the one hand, 
and dynamic industrialising countries, on the other. The former ones are capable of 
controlling international production networks and markets via new technologies, 
financial muscles, and superior business models, while the latter ones are characterised 
by extremely low wages and highly disciplined work forces. It is possible to escape from 
this trap, and enhance international competitiveness, improve economic performance 
and hence quality of life by introducing new products, production processes and 
services, as well as organisational innovations, leading to higher productivity and 
entering new markets. 
Yet, Hungary is a ‘moderate innovator’, that is, belongs to a group of countries 
characterised by an overall innovation performance below that of the EU-27, together 
with the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. (IUS 
2010) At a first glance, these countries are rather diverse, e.g. in terms of their size, 
structural composition of the economy, level of socio-economic development, and 
historical legacy. Thus, it is crucial to identify the major structural features and 
challenges of the Hungarian national innovation system (NIS). That is a first step to 
better understand these issues, to be followed by adequate policy replies, bearing in 
mind the limitations of policies. 
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This chapter highlights five major structural challenges of the Hungarian NIS. It should 
be stressed, however, that these are not at the same level of ‘granularity’. The first two 
ones can be understood as symptoms, which are important enough to consider them on 
their own; the third one is an ‘early warning’ signal; while the last two ones are not only 
important symptoms on their own, but also major reasons to be considered when 
explaining poor performance. Obviously, for a full explanation other factors should also 
be included. 
1) Low level of innovation activities, especially that of the SMEs 
Given the strong need for being innovative to “escape from the nutcraker”, it is a 
challenge itself that only one-fifth of enterprises introduce product or process 
innovations in Hungary, with no major change since 2002.11 This ratio is even lower for 
SMEs: only 16.8% of them introduced product or process innovations in 2006-2008, that 
is, 49% of the EU-27 average. (This figure was the same in 2004-2006, and slightly 
higher in 2002-2004: 17.6%.) The occurrence of organisational and marketing 
innovations among SMEs is also low compared to the EU average (52%), and declined 
from 25.3% in 2002-2004 to 20.5% in 2006-2008. (IUS and CIS) 
2) Low occurrence of co-operation in innovation activities among key actors 
Innovation processes draw on different types of knowledge and skills, often possessed 
by various types of actors. Co-operation among them is, therefore, indispensable for 
successful exploitation of knowledge. At an aggregate level, the frequency of innovation 
co-operation reported by Hungarian firms is higher than in most EU countries (Hungary 
is ranked 6 with 41.3% in CIS 2008; the EU average is not available). Yet, only 6.5% of 
innovative firms reported any form of co-operation with Hungarian “government or 
public research institutes”, and with that figure Hungary ranked 16 among the EU 
countries. Moreover, the occurrence of this type of co-operation has declined from 8.6% 
in 1999-2001. (It was 6.4% in 2002-2004, and 6.1% in 2004-2006.) Further, the weight 
of the public research institutes is high in Hungary, albeit declining: this sector 
accounted for 23.4% of GERD in 2008 and still for 18.5% in 2010, while the EU-27 
average was 13.3%. (Eurostat) Thus, the low intensity of co-operation in this category is 
certainly a challenge. 
As for SMEs, only 7.1% of them were engaged in innovation collaboration with other 
partners in 2006-2008, while the EU average was 11.2%. Similar data are not available 
for large firms. As for innovative firms – those with technological innovation –, co-
operation patterns of SMEs and large firms can be compared. The share of large 
innovative companies co-operating with suppliers of equipment, materials, components 
or software was 43.2% in 2006-2008, and thus Hungary ranked 15 among the EU 
countries. The same figures for small innovative firms (with 10-49 employees) and 
medium-sized ones were 24.8%, and 26.7%, respectively. It is even more worrisome 
that only 16.2% of small innovative firms were co-operating with their clients or 
customers, and 18.5% of the medium-sized ones did so. This issue can be taken as a 
specific feature of a broader challenge, that is, the dual economy syndrome: the 
Hungarian economy is composed of highly productive and technologically advanced 
foreign-owned large firms, on the one hand, and fragile, financially and technologically 
weak indigenous SMEs, on the other. This challenge, therefore, would need attention 
both by STI and economic policy-makers. 
3) Insufficient quantity and of human resources for R&D and innovation is forecast for 
                                                        
11
 The weakest performers in the EU were Hungary, Latvia, Poland, and Romania in 2006-2008, with 
20.8%, 20.1%, 19.8%, and 19.7%, respectively, while the EU average was 51.6%. (CIS 2008) 
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2015 
The future of R&D and innovation activities is predetermined by the quality and 
quantity of scientists and engineers, and the level of skills more generally. Yet, both the 
share of S&E graduates and the rate of participation in life-long learning are rather low 
in international comparison. A significant gap might be opening between the supply and 
demand for qualified science and engineering (S&E) personnel in the near future. The 
number of graduates (ISCED 5-6) in mathematics, science and technology per 1 000 of 
population aged 20-29 grew from 5.8 in 2006 to 7.5 in 2009, that is, 52.4% of the EU-27 
average (14.3) The share of doctoral graduates in the 25-34-year age group increased 
from 0.6 (per 1,000 people) in 2006 to 0.9 in 2009, but it was still only 60% the EU-27 
average (1.5). Even though the trend shows improvement, the number of PhD degree 
holders is forecast to be insufficient in the medium run for maintaining the quality of the 
Hungarian research system. (Tamás et al., 2005) The share of population aged 30-34 
having completed tertiary education increased from 14.8% in 2000 to 23.9% in 2009, 
reaching 74% of the EU average (32.3%). Further, brain drain seems to be an element of 
this broad challenge: it is primarily the highly qualified, young workers, especially those 
with S&E degrees that are overrepresented within the group of Hungarians working 
abroad. (Csanádi et al., 2008) 
4) Unfavourable framework conditions for innovation 
The macroeconomic situation, the structure of the economy, the overall 
entrepreneurship culture together with the intensity and type of competition seem to 
influence firms’ behaviour with such a power that STI policy schemes cannot offer 
strong enough incentives to overrule these unfavourable effects.12 
5) Shortcomings in STI policy 
The OECD Review on Innovation Policy has identified five aspects of policy failures, of 
which four are highlighted in this report: (i) lack of political commitment, (ii) instability, 
(iii) shortfalls in implementation, (iv) slow, insufficiently informed policy learning 
processes. (OECD, 2008, pp. 15-16; details are discussed in section 3) 
3 Assessment of the national innovation strategy 
3.1 National research and innovation priorities 
The Government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013) defines six priorities: 
 “Expansion of companies’ research and development activities; 
 Establishment of internationally recognized research & development, innovation 
centres and research universities; 
 Enhancing of the regions’ research & development & innovation (R&D&I) capacity; 
 Establishing a knowledge market which works on the principles of performance 
recognition and competition through the globalization of knowledge production and 
dissemination; 
 Investment in large scientific facilities, primarily in the regional centres and the 
development poles, reducing regional differences (regional cohesion); 
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 For more details, see, section 3, as well as Havas, 2011a; Havas and Nyiri, 2007; and OECD, 2008. 
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 The dynamic increase in yearly R&D expenditure, above all as a result of growth in 
corporate expenditure.” (Government, 2007, p. 3) 
A new science and innovation policy document, entitled Science - Innovation 
Programme, was published in January 2011. It is a chapter in the broader New 
Széchenyi Plan (Hungarian acronym: ÚSzT), often referred by politicians to as the basic 
development strategy document of the second Orbán government.13 Most likely, 
however, priorities set for the planning period of 2007-2013 – already approved by the 
European Union – cannot be altered in 2011-2012.14 
The Science - Innovation Programme offers an overview of the Hungarian national 
innovation system, highlights strengths and weaknesses – based on the 2009 European 
Innovation Scoreboard indicators, as well as on the OECD review of the Hungarian 
innovation policy (OECD, 2008) –, sets STI policy goals, and identifies thematic/ sectoral 
priorities. The latter ones are as follows: mobility,15 automotive industry, and logistics; 
health industries (pharmaceuticals, medical biotechnologies and instruments, 
balneology); ICT; energy and environmental technologies; creative industries.16 
The Science - Innovation Programme highlights the role of tax incentives, favourable 
loans, and seed capital in advanced countries. On that basis it stipulates that the 
Hungarian STI policy mix should be reconsidered, e.g. tax incentives, vouchers for 
innovation services, loans, guarantees, and seed capital should play a more prominent 
role in the innovation policy toolbox than it is the case currently. Since the launch of this 
document, however, no such changes have occurred. 
No major new policy tools have been introduced since the end of 2009, and thus there 
have been no noteworthy changes in the STI policy mix. There was an abrupt disruption 
in using domestic public funds for promoting RTDI activities: ~€58.2m (HUF16b) was 
“blocked” from the Research and Technological Innovation Fund (RTIF) in June 2010, 
that is, 36.6% of the Fund’s 2010 budget. To achieve this target, all disbursements from 
the RTIF were suspended; and new project proposals were not accepted, either. The law 
on the central budget for 2011 (Act CLXIX of 2010) did not allow to make new 
commitments to finance RTDI projects from the RTIF in 2011. Thus, new calls of the on-
going STI policy support schemes were not launched, let alone new schemes.17 As for the 
STI policy support schemes co-financed by the EU Structural Funds (as part of the 
Economic Development Operational Programme, GOP), three of them were suspended in 
                                                        
13
 In 2002-2010, governments were supported either by a coalition of the socialist and a liberal party, 
or the previous one (in minority in the Parliament). The 2010 elections brought a fundamental change: 
a coalition of two right wing parties obtained a two-third majority in the Parliament. The current prime 
minister was in office in 1998-2002, and hence the current government is the second Orbán 
government. 
14
 It is telling that not even the previous acronym in the codes denoting these schemes have been 
changed: the ones launched in 2011 are called GOP-2011-1.1.1; GOP-2011-1.2.1., etc. 
15
 Mobility is to be understood here as transport, that is, not as researchers’ mobility. 
16
 Agriculture is also mentioned briefly as an important field for R&D and innovation, but unlike in the 
case of the other sectors/ technologies, no sub-section is devoted to these technologies. 
17
 In more details, it was allowed to use the RTIF in 2011 to finance (a) on-going RTDI projects – that 
is, to meet contractual obligations, based on previous funding decisions –; (b) the activities of S&T 
attachés; (c) the creation and operation of databases, as well as analyses and monitoring activities to 
underpin STI policy decisions; (c) the domestic co-funding of STI policy schemes financed by the EU 
SF and research infrastructure development projects in EU co-operation; (d) membership fees/ 
contributions stemming from international STI co-operation agreements, organisations and research 
infrastructure; (e) the operation of the RTIF; (f) other relevant international commitments, especially 
those related to the EU membership of Hungary. 
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2010, and two of these were not re-launched in 2011, either. The other major GOP 
schemes were continued in 2011. 
In sum, practically ‘freezing’ the main domestic fund to finance STI policy support 
schemes has hindered the launching of any new measures, while previous commitments 
– both in terms of actual granting decisions on-going RTDI projects and the Operational 
Programmes stipulating the types of schemes co-financed by the EU Structural Funds – 
impeded the reallocation of available funds. Due to these financial constraints, it has not 
been possible to amend the policy mix. 
From a different angle, although the so-called New Széchenyi Plan sets several new 
thematic/ sectoral priorities for STI policy – as already mentioned –, no new schemes 
have been introduced to support RTDI activities in these S&T domains/ economic 
sectors. 
Besides an on-line consultation on the Science – Innovation Programme there has been 
no major event devoted to national innovation policy discussions since 2009. Sporadic 
exchanges – e.g. short articles in dailies or weeklies, radio interviews – are dominated by 
budget cuts and organisational changes in the STI policy governance sub-system. The 
role of innovation in addressing societal challenges, and social innovation are non-issues 
in Hungary. 
Evaluation of individual innovation policy measures or the policy mix as whole is still 
not a widely used practice in Hungary, either, especially in the case of nationally 
financed schemes. (ÁSz, 2008b, p. 48) As for nationally funded support schemes, one of 
the basic principles of the Law on Research and Technological Innovation was that 
publicly financed STI policy measures shall regularly be evaluated by independent 
experts. Despite these stipulations, only four nationally funded STI policy schemes have 
been evaluated since 2006.18 
An evaluation report on the operation of the Research and Technological Innovation 
Fund in 2004-2009 was published in July 2010. As this is the main source to fund 
domestic STI policy support schemes, the assessment offered in this report can be used 
as good ‘proxy’ to gauge an important chunk of the innovation policy mix. Three key 
findings are highlighted in the executive summary of this report: 
 uncertain support for innovation at the government level, 
 the Fund has a marked and significant impact on the economy,19 
 managing the Fund calls for significant improvements. (Ernst & Young and GKI, 
                                                        
18
 This ‘sporadic’ evaluation practice is not unique to STI policies in Hungary, and hence the State 
Audit Office has stressed that several billion euros for economic and regional development purposes 
had been allocated without clearly defined goals, rationales for state intervention, and efficient co-
ordination of sectoral strategies. The impact of state intervention cannot be established due to the lack 
of clearly defined targets and systematic evaluation. (ÁSz, 2008a) 
19
 This heading is more optimistic than the detailed observations: “The KTI Fund was necessary to 
keep the level of Hungarian public funding on RDI. (…) The concentration of support financed by the 
Fund varies significantly in the different sectors. (…) e.g. the Academy, large universities received 
significantly more support than organisations in other sectors. (…) about 10-15% of the 2,600 
companies that received grants had success on the market. (…) Indirectly, in certain sectors (e.g. IT, 
engineering), the return on funding provided by the KTI Fund is often multiplied. (…) At the level of the 
macro-economy, the public funding on R&D resulted considerable additional welfare effects, and not 
necessarily at the economic agent that received funding. (…) the corporate sector and the universities/ 
public research institut[e]s have definitely come closer to one another.” (pp. 5-6) 
As already highlighted in section 2 of this country report, the share of innovative companies has 
remained at a very low level since 2002. The full text of the evaluation report – only available in 
Hungarian – also acknowledges that there has been no noticeable improvement in terms 
strengthening innovation activities of businesses. (Ernst & Young and GKI, 2010b, p. 134) 
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2010a) 
Schemes co-funded by the EU Structural Funds must be evaluated, following the EU 
rules.20 
The most recent assessment concerning the entire innovation policy mix was published 
in 2008 as part of the OECD review on the Hungarian NIS.21 (OECD, 2008) The 
“Shortcomings in science, technology and innovation policy” are discussed under the 
following headings, which can be understood as a forceful, concise summary: lack of 
political commitment; instability; shortfalls in implementation; slow pace of reform; 
slow, insufficiently informed policy learning process. (ibid., pp. 15-16) 
Impartial observers would agree that not much improvement has occurred since 2008; 
in fact, in some respects the current situation is even worse: decreased government 
funding indicates an even lower level of political commitment; yet another wave of 
reorganisation of major STI policy-making bodies has further undermined stability, 
prevented organisational learning, and thus hampered improvements in policy design 
and implementation. Framework conditions for innovation have not become more 
favourable, either.22 
In conclusion, the innovation policy challenges identified in the above reports are so 
many and so fundamental that no ‘quick fix’ is possible; and thus no major improvement 
can be expected in 2012-13. 
3.2 Trends in R&D funding 
The government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013) stipulates that GERD 
should increase to 1.8% of the GDP by 2013 (up from 1.0% in 2006), while BERD should 
reach 0.9% of the GDP (from 0.45% in 2006). These goals seem to be overly optimistic: 
independent analysts had expressed serious doubts concerning the feasibility of these 
targets even before the global financial crisis. (OECD, 2008) 
The Science – Innovation Programme, launched in January 2011, sets similar broad aims 
as the government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013), but it stipulates revised 
quantitative targets: 
 R&D and innovation expenditures (that is, not GERD) should reach 1.5% of GDP by 
2015, and “approach” 2% by 2020; 
 innovation performance, measured by the Summary Innovation Index, should reach 
the EU average, and Hungary should belong to the top third of EU members in the 
“next cycle”. (p. 234) 
The National Reform Programme, launched in April 2011, sets yet again different 
quantitative targets: “Hungary intends to achieve an increase in the level of research and 
development expenditures up to 1.8 per cent of GDP by 2020, in such a way that the share 
of corporate R&D spending should rise relative to overall research and development 
expenditures. As an intermediate target, the New Széchenyi Plan aims to achieve an R&D 
expenditure rate of 1.5 per cent by the middle of the decade.” (NRP 2011, p. 21; 
emphasis in the original)23 
                                                        
20
 Ex-ante, mid-term, and ex-post evaluations are published at the National Development Agency’s 
website. 
21
 The overall assessment and recommendations of the OECD report are summarised in 20 pages, of 
which 3 dedicated to a SWOT table. It cannot be summarised in a few sentences in this report. 
22
 Section 3.3 describes the framework conditions in more details; see also, e.g. Havas, 2009, 2011. 
23
 Lack of a consistent terminology adds to the already existing difficulties to comprehend what 
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Data have confirmed the doubts of independent analysts: the Hungarian GERD/GDP 
ratio remained at 1% in 2007-2008; then reached 1.17% and 1.16% in 2009 and 2010, 
respectively. 
Table 2: Basic indicators for R&D investments in Hungary 
 2008 2009 2010 
EU average 
2010 
GDP growth rate 0.9 -6.8 1.3 2,0 
GERD as % of GDP 1.0 1.17 1.16 2.0 
GERD per capita (€) 105.4 106.4 112.4 490.2 
GBAORD (€ million) 453.5 426.6 468.6 92,729.05 
GBAORD as % of GDP 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.76 
BERD (€ million) 556.8 610.8 673.5 151,125.56 
BERD as % of GDP 0.53 0.67 0.69 1.23 
GERD financed by abroad as % of total GERD 9.27 10.90 12.35 N/A24 
R&D performed by HEIs (% of GERD) 22.04 20.94 19.93 24.2 
R&D performed by PROs (% of GERD) 23.39 20.06 18.52 13.2 
R&D performed by businesses (as % of GERD) 52.57 57.24 59.81 61.5 
Source: Eurostat 
The increase in the GERD/GDP ratio is due to a combined effect of two factors: (i) given 
the global financial and economic crisis, the Hungarian GDP shrank by 6.8% in 2009, and 
grew only moderately in 2010, while (ii) GERD continued to rise in nominal terms (by 
0.76% in 2009, and 5.52% in 2010). 
The Hungarian GERD/GDP still trails the EU-27 average (2.0% in 2010). In relative 
terms GOVERD is the closest to the EU-27 average (78%), while the share of BERD and 
HERD in GDP is 56% and 47% of the corresponding EU-27 indicators (Table 2). 
Table 3 : The Hungarian GERD, BERD, HERD, and GOVERD, 2010 
 € million 
Share in EU-27 
total (%) 
% of GDP, 
Hungary 
% of GDP, EU-27 
average 
% of GDP, EU-27 
average = 100 
GERD 1,126,1 0.46 1.16 2.0 58 
BERD 673.5 0.45 0.69 1.23 56 
HERD 224.4 0.38 0.23 0.49 47 
GOVERD 208.5 0.64 0.21 0.27 78 
Source: Eurostat data, and author’s calculation 
BERD increased considerably – by 9.7% in 2009 and 10.27% in 2010 – and thus the 
BERD/GERD ratio jumped from 52.57% in 2008 to 59.81% in 2010, approaching the EU-
27 average (61.51%). This increase was financed mainly by public and foreign funds: 
while the share of businesses in financing BERD decreased from 79.8% in 2008 to 71.0% 
and 70.8% in 2009, and 2010, respectively, the share of public funds25 grew from 8.6% 
                                                                                                                                                                             
document is to be taken as the one reflecting the government’s intentions, and what quantitative 
targets are to be used as yardsticks: the New Széchenyi Plan – only available in Hungarian – speaks 
of R&D and innovation expenditures, while the NRP 2011 refers to the New Széchenyi Plan as if it 
speaks of R&D expenditures. 
24 8.4 (2009), 9.04 (2005) 
25
 It should be noted that public funds include the EU Structural Funds, too. 
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in 2008 to 15.5% and 14.0% in 2009-2010, and the same figures for foreign funding are 
11.4%, 13.4%, and 15.0%, respectively. 
Institutional – or core – funding is vital for the operation of research units at HE 
organisations and PROs. There are two principal channels for providing such funding: 
normative support for R&D activities conducted at HEIs, and support to the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences. Using GBAORD figures as a proxy for institutional funding, R&D 
financed from General University Funds (GUF) accounted for 27.7% and 22.9% of 
GBAORD in 2009, and 2010, respectively, while the figures for R&D financed from other 
sources than GUF were 21.6% and 20.1%; that is, nearly half of the GBAORD was 
allocated via core funding in 2009, and 43% in 2010. (Eurostat) 
Competitive funding is also a major mechanism for public support to RTDI activities. The 
largest funds are the Research and Technological Innovation Fund (KTIA),26 and the 
various Operational Programmes of the New Hungary Development Plan,27 while for 
bottom-up funding is provided by a smaller one, called Hungarian Scientific Research 
Fund (OTKA).28 The largest STI policy support schemes are co-financed by the EU 
Structural Funds, and given the cuts in domestic public funding, the balance has shifted 
significantly towards EU funds taking into account commitments made in 2010. Actual 
funding figures are not publicly available, and using that metrics might lead to a 
somewhat different picture, but probably still with a larger share of EU funds. 
The dominant form of support is to provide grants; yet, other tools are also part of the 
Hungarian STI policy mix. Venture capital, favourable loans, and guarantees do not 
feature in the financial figures on commitments made in 2010: funds had to be set aside 
when these schemes started, and then can be used for 10-15 years. Given the nature of 
tax incentives, they do not appear in commitments figure, either.29 
There are hardly any thematically or sectorally focused support schemes in the 
Hungarian STI policy mix. 
Businesses have to cover certain share of the costs of publicly supported RTDI projects, 
but public-private partnerships, per se, are not used to leverage additional funding. On 
the contrary, the current government has started revising PPP contracts initiated by the 
previous government in other domains (e.g. sport, culture, higher education, 
infrastructure and prison investment projects). (Cseke, 2010) 
3.3 Evolution and analysis of the policy mixes 
The Policy Mix Project, which has identified the following six ‘routes’ to stimulate R&D 
investment: 
1. promoting the establishment of new indigenous R&D performing firms; 
2. stimulating greater R&D investment in R&D performing firms; 
3. stimulating firms that do not perform R&D yet; 
4. attracting R&D-performing firms from abroad; 
5. increasing extramural R&D carried out in co-operation with the public sector or 
other firms; 
                                                        
26
 The annual budget of the KTIA is in the order of €180-200m. 
27
 The most important element is Priority 1, “R&D and innovation for competitiveness” of the Economic 
Development Operational Programme (EDOP). Its budget is €990m for 207-2013, including 15% 
national contribution. 
28
 The annual budget of OTKA is around €20m. 
29
 R&D tax incentives amounted to 0.08% of GDP in 2007. (OECD, 2010, p. 77) 
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6. increasing R&D in the public sector. 
Hungarian STI policy measures are not planned following this logic, e.g. firms that do not 
yet perform RTDI activities and those that do are not differentiated. Thus, it is not 
possible to estimate the relative importance of these routes in Hungary. In general, 
promoting RTDI activities of firms (routes 1-3) is clearly at the centre of policy attention. 
As a rough estimate, around 50% of the amount allocated to competitive RTDI funding 
directly promoted firms’ RTDI activities until mid-2010. R&D and innovation is usually 
targeted simultaneously, therefore most measures have a wider scope than fostering 
R&D investments. Finally, several of the larger programmes (e.g. the National 
Technology Programme) support joint research projects with the participation of 
private and public research units. 
The EWN categorisation of STI policy measures cannot be used either, to characterise 
the evolution of the STI policy mix in Hungary. Annual data on actual spending by 
schemes is not publicly available, and thus an aggregate figure cannot be calculated by 
the broad categories of policy measures. Reliable, sensible estimations can hardly be 
calculated, either: commitments are rarely made for a single year, and it would be a very 
strong – unsubstantiated – assumption to suppose that actual spending is evenly spread 
across years, and hence averages can be used as a good approximation of actual 
spending. 
With these caveats, only some very rudimentary observations can be made as to the 
balance of funding allocated to different types of measures. “Promote and sustain the 
creation and growth of innovative enterprises” is by far the most important group of 
measures, followed by “Governance & horizontal research and innovation policies” (due 
to commitments made in 2010 to support clusters), and “Research and Technologies” 
(thanks to the funds devoted to infrastructure development at universities). Several 
schemes promote the development of “Human Resources”, with small funds compared 
to other schemes, which are much more costly, given their different nature 
(modernisation of production equipment or research infrastructure). Finally, there was 
only one scheme operational in 2010 under the heading of “Markets and innovation 
culture”. 
There have been no major changes in terms of the main target groups of STI policy 
measures over the last three years: some schemes provide support for individual firms, 
while others put the emphasis on industry-academia co-operation or setting up 
accredited innovation clusters, and innovation activities by the members of these 
clusters. The balance between grants, loans, and non-direct funding measures has not 
changed, either. 
Space limits would not allow conducting a thorough analysis of the Hungarian STI policy 
following the Innovation Union self-assessment tool [IU SAT], but several key points can 
be highlighted, drawing on recent reports by independent experts. 
Promoting research and innovation is often mentioned as a key policy instrument to 
enhance competitiveness and job creation, address major societal challenges, and 
improve quality of life. [IU SAT, item 1] Yet, several reports have identified the lack of 
political commitment as a major problem. 
“While important policy documents stipulate science, technology and innovation as a 
policy priority, the requisite public investment and constant high-level policy 
attention to issues related to innovation have too often not followed.” (OECD, 2008, p. 
15) 
“Managing the [Research and Technological Innovation] Fund was continuously 
hampered by government/Parliamentary decisions, which repeatedly restricted the 
use of the Fund’s cumulated residual funds and which occasionally suspended grant 
COUNTRY REPORTS 2011: HUNGARY 
Page 19  
payments already duly awarded. The Fund’s original goals, as set out in the 
underlying act, have been amended by state budget acts several times, when certain 
budgetary obligations were transferred to the Fund (e.g. payment of Hungary’s 
contribution to the European Coal and Steel Research Fund). These unfavourable 
external interventions had a substantial disturbing impact on the Fund’s 
independence and on planning use of the Fund. (Ernst & Young and GKI, 2010a, p. 4) 
Moreover, as already mentioned, almost 40% of the most important domestic fund 
earmarked to support RTDI activities was frozen in 2010, practically no new 
commitments were allowed to make in 2011, and the Bill on the 2012 budget contains 
the same restriction. Hence, political commitment has not become stronger since the 
period covered by the above two reports. Further, the current Hungarian situation is 
also at odds with the requirement of having adequate and predictable public investment 
in research and innovation focused in particular on stimulating private investment [IU 
SAT, item 4]. 
Design and implementation of research and innovation policies is steered at the highest 
political level and based on a multi-annual strategy [IU SAT, item 2]: There has (almost) 
always been a high-level political body to co-ordinate policy efforts. However, this body 
had been reorganised constantly since the 1990s.30 Thus strategy formation has been 
severely hampered. 
“Operations of the KTI Fund have continually been characterised by institutional and 
legal uncertainty to date. Developing and executing the grant schemes could not be 
aligned with a long-term strategy. (…) In the period between the [Research and 
Technological Innovation] Fund’s foundation in 2004 up until early 2007, there was 
no written, government approved innovation strategy. In this period managing the 
Fund was based mostly on the vision of NKTH’s [National Office for Research and 
Technology, the government agency administering the Fund] senior management (…) 
and this remained at the core of NKTH’s programmes and calls for proposals for the 
ensuing years. (…) The STI strategy approved in 2007 and NKTH’s institutional 
strategy dated December 2007 have set general goals without defining a clear 
hierarchy of goals or priorities. These documents do not specify the tools to attain the 
set goals and they do not define the role of the KTI Fund in executing the STI strategy. 
(…) in the absence of mandatory regulations or a properly authorised and competent 
co-ordinating organisation, the status of the KTI Fund and its connection to the other 
related policy tools remains unclear. 
This situation was aggravated by the fact that decisions taken regarding the Fund 
were not supported by evaluations, therefore there was almost no feedback regarding 
the impact of the interventions implemented during the period under review. (…) 
Despite the efforts made, the fragmented nature of NKTH’s databases about the 
proposals and projects as well as the occasionally inaccurate, in other cases missing 
data records equally hamper strategic management, organisational learning and 
evaluations. 
                                                        
30
 For a long period this body was called the Science and Technology Policy Council (TTPK), and for 
several years it was headed by the prime minister, and at the end of the 1990s by a representative of 
the prime minister; its secretariat had also been moved around the Prime Minister’s Office and other 
ministries. These organisational changes had clearly reflected its diminishing political clout. Moreover, 
it had rarely met since 1998; between 2003 and 2006 on average it met once a year. Then it had not 
met until it was dissolved in March 2009. Half a year later a new high-level STI policy co-ordination 
body was created, called Research and Science Policy Council. It held its first and only meeting on 17 
February 2010, chaired by the prime minister. It was disbanded on 15 December 2010 by a 
government decree stipulating the creation of the National Research, Innovation, and Science Policy 
Council. 
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Until the end of the reviewed period, NKTH performed rather poor monitoring. As a 
result, the Fund’s programmes and projects could not provide the feedback important 
for programme planning or evaluating the proposals. The Fund does not use 
indicators to monitor the progress of its mid-term strategy, programmes or projects 
or to monitor direct and indirect impacts. 
In the reviewed period, NKTH commissioned independent experts only occasionally 
with the task of evaluating the Fund’s operation, and no such evaluation was directed 
towards the Fund’s operations or the programmes as a whole. Thus, NKTH could not 
experience the benefits of constructive feedback. The majority of these evaluation 
reports were not disclosed to public. (Ernst & Young and GKI, 2010a, pp. 2-5; 
emphases added) 
Innovation policy is pursued in a broad sense going beyond technological research and its 
applications [IU SAT, item 3]: It is telling that the major domestic fund, set up in 2004 to 
support RTDI activities, was named Research and Technological Innovation Fund, 
although several experts suggested to embrace the broader concept of innovation. More 
recently, several schemes, co-funded by the EU Structural Funds, have been introduced 
to promote improvements of processes and organisational change, introduction of new 
business models, and marketing. 
Partnerships between higher education institutes, research centres and businesses are 
actively promoted [IU SAT, item 7] by several schemes, and for years in Hungary. 
Evaluation reports offer somewhat contradictory assessments: Ernst & Young and GKI, 
2010b concludes that industry-academy co-operation has strengthened (pp. 87-90), 
while foreign experts have claimed that business-academia linkages are weak primarily 
due to the mismatch in the incentive structures of these different types of players, as 
well as the insufficient understanding of the industry’s needs in academic circles. 
(Arnold et al., 2007)31 This issue needs to be revisited when CIS 2010 data become 
available. 
Framework conditions to promote business investment in R&D, entrepreneurship and 
innovation [IU SAT, item 8]: Macroeconomic policies have failed to create a stable, 
predictable environment for businesses. Economic growth has been volatile at least 
since the mid-1990s, due to the stop-go type policies to a large extent. Inflation has 
constantly been above the target, and thus making business planning a more demanding 
task. Government behaviour has also been unpredictable (e.g. the tax code has been 
rewritten frequently). Both the general government deficit and the general government 
debt (as a percentage of GDP) have been rather high, i.e. the economy has suffered from 
twin deficit, as well as a high level of government borrowing. Businesses, in turn, felt the 
crowding out effect of the mounting fiscal deficit. In sum, the macroeconomic 
environment has been unfavourable for RTDI activities of firms.32 
Administrative costs incurred by businesses are high by international standards, and 
that is especially unfavourable for SMEs. It takes just a little bit longer in Hungary to 
register a new company than the OECD average (16 vs. 14.9 days), but costs are around 
                                                        
31
 Similarly, a report by the Ministry of Economy and Transport points out that despite the relatively 
good performance of public research institutes (in terms of scientific output, in international 
comparison), there is a weak or no consideration for industrial needs in these units. Scientific 
excellence is still considered the first and foremost criterion for advancement in the HE and 
government research sector; economic relevance of research is given far less attention. Economic 
aspects are not considered in the management of such institutes, whereas knowledge transfer is 
impeded by an alarmingly low level of researcher mobility between research performing sectors. 
(GKM, 2008, p. 43-44) 
32
 For further details, see, e.g. Havas, 2011a and 2011c 
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3.5 times higher (17.7 vs. 5.1% of GNI per capita), and the capital requirement is two 
times higher (65.1 vs. 32.5% of GNI per capita). Closing down an operation takes double 
amount of resources, and 8.4 months longer compared to the OECD average. The tax 
system is also putting a significantly higher administrative burden on companies; 
moreover, the total tax rate is notably higher than the OECD average (55.1% vs. 46.0% 
of profit).33 
The Hungarian competition and IPR rules are in accordance with the EU legislation and 
international treaties. (OECD, 2008) It seems, however, that regulation is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for an intense market competition, inducing innovation. 
Most firms do not feel the pressure to innovate. When asked about the factors 
hampering innovation, financial constrains are mentioned with the highest frequency by 
Hungarian respondents, but market conditions also play a non-negligible role.34 (Table 
4) 
Table 4: Major factors hampering innovations, 2004-2006 
 
Enterprises with 
technological 
innovation 
Non-Innovative 
enterprises 
Lack of funds within enterprise or enterprise group 28.8% 25.5% 
Lack of finance from external sources 19.9% 17.0% 
Innovation costs too high 27.3% 28.2% 
Lack of qualified personnel 14.0% 8.9% 
Markets dominated by established enterprises 15.4% 17.6% 
Uncertain demand for innovative goods or services 14.0% 20.4% 
No need to innovate because no demand for 
innovations 
4.0% 10.5% 
Source: Eurostat, CIS 2006 
Notes: 1) These replies refer to those firms that selected these factors as highly important ones. 2) Not all 
hampering factors are included in this table. 3) These questions were not included in the CIS 2008 
questionnaire, and thus more recent data are not available until the results of the CIS 2010 survey are 
published. 
Public support to research and innovation in businesses is simple, easy to access and high 
quality in a well performing innovation system. [IU SAT, item 9] The Hungarian NIS 
cannot be characterised by this feature:  
“Owing to a lack of stability and to frequent organisational changes, the timing of 
managing the grants and the projects (e.g. contract preparations, reimbursement of 
costs) was highly hectic and this has had a damaging effect on the quality of 
technical performance. 
We have observed weaknesses in the process of evaluating the proposals (e.g. there 
were incomplete procedure manuals, sketchy documentation, not sufficient 
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 For further, regularly updated data, as well as details of the methods, see 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings. 
34
 There are no readily available analyses on the impacts of competition on innovation, only on R&D. 
(Halpern and Muraközy, 2011) 
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information contained in the letters explaining rejection of proposals etc.). In 
addition, in some cases and referring to the first half of the period evaluated, some 
interviewees reported professional and ethical types of conflicts of interest and 
other not purely professional considerations (about external impacts beyond the 
operation and regulation of the Fund) experienced in the decision making process 
(…). 
In the reviewed period many organisations contributed to managing the tendering 
system and the projects from the government side. The parties involved and their 
respective roles in the system (for example between NKTH and MAG Zrt.) have often 
changed. This often slowed down and hindered the Fund’s efforts to meet its 
contractual obligations, especially regarding the reimbursement of costs.” (ibid., pp. 
4-5) 
The Hungarian Association for Innovation has also pointed out at several occasions that 
even once a decision is made, it takes unduly long time before the contracts are signed 
(let alone disbursements), not least because new project documents are demanded even 
at this stage of the procedure. 
The number of STI policy schemes is rather high, and thus some schemes tend to 
overlap. Thus, well-targeted efforts are needed, such as fine-tuning the direct and 
indirect instruments, sector-specific and generic schemes, streamlining the portfolio 
of measures to avoid overlaps and make it more transparent. (OECD, 2008) The 
policy mix has been deemed insufficiently transparent and potentially inefficient by 
the State Audit Office, too. (ÁSz, 2008b, pp. 43-44) The high number of schemes in 
itself indicates the ad hoc nature of policy-making: the current policy mix is rather a 
collection of otherwise stand-alone, isolated initiatives and actions, than a result of 
conscious and co-ordinated (re-)targeting of policy strategies. 
As already mentioned, funding schemes are irregularly evaluated and benchmarked 
against comparable schemes in other countries. 
However, specific schemes offer support to young innovative companies to help them 
commercialise ideas. 
Public sector as a driver of innovation [IU SAT, item 10]: measures are in a preparatory 
phase both at a regional and national level to introduce pre-commercial procurement as 
a policy tool. The Public Procurement Council considers this issue as a priority, and aims 
at disseminating relevant information among stakeholders. Further, the Science and 
Innovation Programme of the New Széchenyi Plan highlights pre-commercial 
procurement among the priorities, with proposed actions including: (i) dissemination 
the culture of pre-commercial procurement, and (ii) application of pre-commercial 
procurement in tendering in order to enhance developments in the ICT sector. 
3.4 Assessment of the policy mix 
The overall paradoxical feature of the Hungarian NIS is that innovation performance is 
‘moderate’ (IU Scoreboard 2010) in spite of an impressive number and range of STI 
policy measures, which seem to be appropriate. Further, there are ‘recurring’ severe 
macroeconomic imbalances, too, at least for years, if not decades. In such an uncertain 
environment firms tend to focus on day-to-day survival, and thus RTDI activities are 
rarely in the focus of business strategies. 
A comprehensive project would be needed to analyse (a) the impacts of the various 
policies affecting economic and innovation performance; (b) the links between these 
policies; (c) as well as the interrelationships between innovation and economic 
performance (at micro, mezzo, and macro levels). Clearly, this report alone cannot offer 
such a complex treatise of these issues. Moreover, a proven and operational general 
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theory on these issues is yet to be developed. These links are always indirect, complex, 
and occur with considerable delays. Moreover, it is hardly possible to disentangle the 
effects of various economic and other macro-level policies and STI policies per se. 
As to the individual challenges highlighted in Chapter 2, at least the first three of them 
have been identified in various policy documents by the government, while the other 
two ones by independent experts and international organisations. None of them are 
recently identified challenges, and hence several measures have been introduced to 
promote RTDI activities of firms, strengthen industry-academia co-operation, and 
increase the supply of S&E graduates. In brief, somewhat modest improvement has been 
achieved in these three fields, and hence STI policy measures have not been highly 
effective. 
As already shown, the share of innovative firms has not increased – at least not up to 
2008, i.e. the latest available CIS results. The BERD/GDP ratio, however, has escalated 
from 0.36% in 2004 to 0.69% by 2010, but still lagging considerably behind the EU-27 
average (1.23%). From a different angle, it is not only way below the Barcelona target, 
but also the government’s own target of 0.9% of GDP to be reached by 2013 (according 
to the mid-term STI policy strategy). 
Private research efforts are conducted to a disproportionately large extent by large, 
mainly foreign-owned firms in a handful of sectors.35 Large firms accounted for 57.0% of 
BERD in 2010, but their weight had been even higher, that is, between 70 and 80% in 
2000-2007. While the share of research units operated at foreign-owned businesses 
remained below 15%, these firms accounted for 66-74% of BERD in 2003-2007, 
decreasing to 60.9% in 2010. Notably, the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal 
chemicals and botanical products accounted for 58.0% of the total R&D spending in 
manufacturing industry in 2006 (Eurostat), and still 47.9% in 2010. (KSH) That implies 
that RTDI strategies of the parent companies of these subsidiaries are at least as 
important as Hungarian STI policies. 
As for industry-academia co-operation, mixed assessments are offered by evaluation 
reports (see section 3.3). One indicator shows some improvement: the number of 
public-private co-publications per million inhabitants has increased from 15.5 in 2003 
to 19.6 in 2008, but it is still 54% of the EU average. 
With regard to human resources for R&D and innovation, although several indicators 
have shown improvement, Hungary is still way below the EU-27 average. (Figures are 
reported in section 2.) 
A ‘desirable’ ratio of S&E students cannot be achieved in the short-run: it is not a 
question of mechanically increasing the number of enrolled students at the relevant 
faculties.36 First, as a basic precondition, S&E education has to build on high-quality 
primary and secondary education. Second, more attractive job prospects are needed to 
lure young talents towards S&E careers. Government policies alone can create these 
prospects in the public research sector only. When economic development, education, 
employment, and STI policies are pooled together, devised and implemented in an 
orchestrated and effective way, they can also induce businesses to create this type of 
jobs, but the actual decisions and investment should be made by businesses. Thus, a 
much wider policy perspective is needed, as well as concerted public and private efforts, 
sustained for a longer time-horizon, to deal with this complex challenge. 
                                                        
35
 R&D data are available either by size or ownership, and thus reported here in this way. Yet, one 
should bear in mind that most large firms are foreign-owned in Hungary. 
36
 Both the absolute number and the share of S&E students (all levels) has increased in recent years, 
from 76,217 (18.0%) in 2005 to 82,196 (22.8%) in 2010, while that of S&E graduates from 7,227 
(10.3%) to 10,786 (16.4%) in the same period. (KSH) 
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Framework conditions for innovation have not improved, as already stressed in 
section 3.3. 
Shortcomings in STI policy, as identified by the OECD Review on Innovation Policy 
(2008), have not been rectified, either. Lack of political commitment is still a major 
problem. For many years, innovation has not been a major policy issue in Hungary. 
Politicians’ agenda has been almost permanently preoccupied with short-term 
macroeconomic tensions, the complex challenges of the transition process in the 1990s, 
and then joining the European Union, as well as ‘burning’ domestic political issues. 
Further, RTDI is still mainly perceived as burden on the budget, rather than part of the 
solution, i.e. a major factor to socio-economic development. Thus, the potential – and 
obviously long-term – contribution of innovation to socio-economic development is not 
in the centre of political and policy discussions in Hungary: STI policies are eclipsed by 
the immediate political and economic policy goals. 
The last two years have only strengthened this feature. STI policies received hardly any 
attention from politicians in 2010, given the two elections held in the same year (general 
elections in April, followed by local elections in October). Hence, no STI policy changes 
occurred. Given the cuts in domestic public funding for RTDI since June 2010, already 
mentioned, several small companies and bridging organisations, for which revenues 
from government support schemes are crucial sources, already face severe financial 
difficulties, and major decision-preparatory projects, e.g. the one to underpin the 
national RI development strategy, have also been put on halt. More generally, these 
abrupt measures undermine the shaky relationship between the research community, 
firms active in RTDI, and politicians. Highly effective new measures would be needed to 
start building trust again, and re-energise the shocked, demoralised researches What 
can be destroyed overnight, might take years to rebuild. Experienced, highly skilled 
scientists and engineers may leave for other countries where they can continue their 
research activities. Hampering RTDI activities when those would be crucial to be 
prepared for a new, post-crisis era is particularly harmful, no doubt.37 
As for instability, frequent reorganisations of the STI policy governance sub-system have 
become a major feature of the Hungarian NIS. Several studies have noted that 
organisational instability affects negatively policy formation and implementation as it 
hampers organisational learning and imposes unnecessary burdens on RTDI 
performers, too. (Ernst & Young and GKI, 2010a, Havas, 2009, Havas and Nyiri (eds), 
2007, OECD, 2008) This instability “has arguably had detrimental effects on the ability of 
agencies to implement measures consistently, thus blurring signals and creating a good 
deal of uncertainty among beneficiaries of the policy measures. Moreover, excessive 
instability is a serious obstacle to institutional learning and to the adoption of an 
evidence-based approach to STI policy making in Hungary”. (OECD, 2008, p. 15) 
Shortfalls in implementation have also been stressed by the OECD review, confirming 
observations by other analysts: “The difficulties encountered for optimal 
implementation of STI policy are partly related to the lack of commitment and stability. 
If the level of policy attention is low and organisations and institutions undergo frequent 
changes, implementation is likely to suffer. However, additional factors also limit the 
efficiency of the policy system: 
 Scarce capacity at both the national and regional levels to implement a rather large 
number of programmes. 
                                                        
37
 The president of the Hungarian Association for Innovation protested against the cuts in domestic 
public funding for RTDI in several interviews in the electronic and printed media in 2010, and leading 
researchers also stressed the negative consequences of this measure in several articles published in 
dailies and weeklies. 
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 Delayed decisions and tardy provision of promised public funding often make 
planning of projects by R&D performers, notably business enterprises, very difficult.” 
(OECD, 2008, p.15) 
Finally, policy learning processes were described by the OECD Review as slow and 
insufficiently informed. “Tools for strategic policy intelligence and policy learning, such 
as monitoring, evaluation, and technology foresight, are used only occasionally (…).” 
(OECD, 2008, p.16) This list can be extended by the lack of thorough analyses of 
innovation performance (combining census, R&D and innovation data) and technology 
assessment. The government’s STI policy action plan also stipulates that it is an 
important task to apply relevant, up-to-date methods – notably technology foresight, 
technology assessment and technology watch – to identify, co-ordinate and channel 
demands for knowledge. However, the prevailing practice is one of fragmented support 
for RTDI activities, without a comprehensive understanding of knowledge dynamics 
(drivers for the emergence of new knowledge, and demand for knowledge). 
Table 5 : Structural challenges, policy actions, and impacts, Hungary 
Challenges Policy measures/ actions 
Assessment in terms of appropriateness, efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Low level of 
innovation 
activities, 
especially 
that of the 
SMEs 
A large number of schemes 
and increased public 
funding are in place 
providing incentives for 
companies to engage in 
RTDI. 
These measures are appropriate, e.g. in terms of their overall 
objective, the identified target groups, and the tools applied 
(grants and tax incentives). Yet, they are not likely to be 
effective unless framework conditions for RTDI improve 
significantly. 
Low 
occurrence of 
co-operation 
in innovation 
activities 
among key 
actors 
Several schemes have 
provided incentives for 
strengthening industry-
academia co-operation 
since the late 1990s. 
In general, these schemes are appropriate; there is a strong 
rationale to use public funding for this purpose. Public funds 
are not spent as efficiently as it could be: (i) several of these 
measures have overlapped; (ii) these measures might have 
induced ‘rent-seeking’ strategies, leading to superficial and 
temporary collaboration, instead of facilitating knowledge 
circulation and exploitation in a sustained way. Evidence on 
impacts is mixed. The effectiveness of these measures could 
be significantly increased by reforming the public research 
sector, especially placing more emphasis on exploitability of 
knowledge when evaluating research performance. 
Potential 
gaps in the 
quantity and 
quality of 
human 
resources for 
RTDI 
The quota for publicly 
financed students enrolled 
at S&E faculties has been 
increased. 
Financial incentives or mechanical increases in S&E 
enrolment themselves might not yield results without major 
changes in the research and education systems, and 
sustained, concerted public efforts and actions by businesses. 
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Challenges Policy measures/ actions 
Assessment in terms of appropriateness, efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Unfavourable 
framework 
conditions for 
innovation 
Severe austerity measures 
were introduced in 2008-
2009 to cut budget deficit. 
The economic policies 
pursued since June 2010 
have increased fiscal 
tensions by the end of 
2011. 
The fundamental 
institution of a market 
economy, that is, private 
ownership, has been 
severely undermined by 
various laws and measures. 
Given the macroeconomic tensions and the lack of 
meaningful dialogue among the major political parties it is 
uncertain if fundamental reforms, needed to create more 
favourable framework conditions, can be implemented. 
The measures applied since June 2010 have created a less 
transparent and predictable, highly volatile environment. 
Other measures amending private contracts between banks 
and their clients by law, so-called sectoral taxes, and in 
essence nationalising private pension funds’ assets have 
undermined the trust of investors and international 
organisations. 
Two of the three major international credit rating 
organisations downgraded the Hungarian government bonds 
into the “junk” category in December 2011, and the EC pulled 
the plug on preparatory talks with the Hungarian 
government on a joint loan agreement with the IMF. 
Shortcomings 
in STI policy 
The STI policy governance 
sub-system was once again 
reorganised in 2010. 
Domestic funding for RTDI 
was cut severely in 2010-
2011. 
No measures have been taken to rectify the shortcomings 
identified by the OECD Review. 
The reorganisation of the policy governance sub-system has 
further aggravated the problems stemming from instability: 
(i) lack of possibility for organisational learning and thus 
weakened policy formation and implementation capabilities; 
(ii) unnecessary burdens on RTDI performers. 
4 National policy and the European perspective 
An intriguing puzzle can be observed in Hungary: whereas there are a large number of 
apparently relevant policy schemes to foster RTDI activities, innovation performance is 
‘moderate’. Two main reasons have been identified by independent analysts. The first 
one points outside the narrowly defined STI policy domain: the framework conditions 
for innovations influence firms’ behaviour with such a power that STI policy schemes 
cannot offer strong enough incentives to overrule those unfavourable effects. Thus, 
major policy efforts are needed to create favourable framework conditions, notably a 
stable macroeconomic environment; endurable administrative and tax burdens on 
firms; strong demand for new products; a sufficient supply of skilled people for RTDI 
projects; appropriate regulations and standards; effective IPR policies; etc. Further, 
policies affecting these conditions need to be aligned with STI policy efforts to make a 
difference. 
The second set of factors can be grouped together as shortcomings in STI policy-making, 
including lack of political commitment. R&D and innovation needs to be perceived by 
politicians as a major contributor to socio-economic development, as opposed to the 
current – although implicit – understanding, when it is taken as a burden on the budget, 
and thus becoming the first ‘victim’ when budget problems must be solved. 
Frequent changes in the structure of the STI policy governance sub-system has lead to 
organisational instability, which, in turn, affects negatively policy formation and 
implementation as it hampers organisational learning and imposes unnecessary 
burdens on RTDI performers, too. Hence, this sub-system needs to be stabilised. 
Combining these explanatory factors, there seems to be no ‘panacea’ or a simple ‘quick 
fix’ to improve RTDI performance. Substantial efforts are needed, both at the level of the 
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overall strategy formation and the design and implementation of STI policies. At a 
strategic level, conscious co-ordination of major economic and STI policies should is 
needed, guided by an overarching socio-economic development strategy. Foresight 
processes would be useful to underpin these strategies. These systematic, strategic 
dialogues among major stakeholders, supported by thorough, transparent background 
analyses, could also contribute to orchestrating the main objectives at different policy 
domains and levels (macro, mezzo and micro).These dialogues can also highlight how 
RTDI processes – advanced by appropriate STI policies – can contribute to overall socio-
economic development. Policies affecting RTDI processes and performance need also to 
be orchestrated. Up-to-date decision-preparatory methods – most notably thorough 
analyses of innovation performance, combining census, R&D and innovation data; 
evaluation of individual policy measures, as well as that of the policy mix as a whole; and 
technology assessment – should be relied upon when devising and implementing STI 
policy measures, also assisted by recurring consultations with the major actors of the 
national innovation system. 
Taking a somewhat mechanistic approach, the European Research Area does not feature 
prominently in Hungarian STI policy documents. It is only mentioned in the 
government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013) in a footnote, when referring to 
important EU policy documents. Further, ERA is mentioned in the National Lisbon 
Action Plan (2008-10) in connection with the National Research Infrastructure Survey 
and Roadmap (NEKIFUT, Nemzeti Kutatási Infrastruktúra Felmérés és Útiterv) project, 
as well as when listing other ERA-related activities, concerning joint programming, 
mobility schemes and international co-operation. 
Taking a broader approach, the government’s mid-term STI policy strategy (2007-2013) 
stresses the need to align the national and EU STI policy goals: “It is Hungary’s primary 
interest that taking into account its own situation, financial opportunities and 
endeavours, it should contribute to the realization of the common European goals, 
besides defining its own national interests and strategic goals” (p. 5). Thus, while the 
national STI policy mix is not aligned with the specific ERA pillars and objectives in an 
explicit, purposeful way, there is no major tension between the national policy goals and 
the ERA initiatives, either. As already indicated, severe cuts in government funding for 
RTDI since mid-2010 have prevented the launch of new schemes. Hence, only recent 
measures can be mentioned in Table 6 (not new ones in a strict sense, i.e. introduced in 
2001). 
Table 6: Assessment of the national policies/ measures supporting the 
strategic ERA objectives (derived from ERA 2020 Vision) 
 ERA dimension Main challenges at national level Recent policy changes 
1 
Labour market for 
researchers 
The share of S&E graduates is half of 
the EU average 
Potential gap in the supply of human 
resources for RTDI 
Working conditions for researchers 
are not attractive enough 
Higher quota of publicly 
financed students enrolled 
at S&E faculties 
Worsening working 
conditions due to the severe 
cuts in government funding 
for RTDI since June 2010 
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 ERA dimension Main challenges at national level Recent policy changes 
2 Cross-border co-operation 
Given the low level of public funding 
for R&D, Hungary can only fund 
cross-border co-operation to a rather 
limited extent 
Schemes to support 
participation in EUREKA, 
COST, FP7, and ERA-Net 
projects, Joint Technology 
Initiatives (JTIs), and joint 
programming have already 
been introduced since the 
early or mid-2000s 
Some of them have been 
affected by the cuts applied 
since June 2010: no new 
calls were published 
3 
World class research 
infrastructures 
An uneven technical level of RIs: a 
mix of up-to-date and outdated 
facilities 
Lack of a comprehensive RI 
investment strategy, suboptimal use 
of public funds 
A strategy-building process 
to underpin RI policies was 
launched in 2008, on hold 
since mid-2010. 
Participation in devising the 
ESFRI Roadmap, 
commitment to host one of 
the ELI sites 
4 Research organisations 
Uneven teaching and research 
performance of HEIs 
Several schemes to 
modernise education and 
research facilities at 
universities were 
introduced in 2007* 
5 Public-private partnerships 
Low occurrence of co-operation in 
innovation activities among key 
actors 
Low level of inter-sectoral mobility 
Several STI policy measures 
to foster industry-academia 
collaboration are in place 
since the early or mid-2000s 
6 
Knowledge circulation 
across Europe 
Fairly limited means to contribute to 
the development of a sustainable, 
efficient, and effective European 
scientific information system 
There are no specific 
Hungarian policy measures 
aimed at enhancing open 
circulation of knowledge 
across national borders and 
open access to research 
outputs 
7 International co-operation 
In most cases grants offered by 
bilateral agreements between 
Hungary and other countries cover 
only travel and subsistence costs (not 
costs of conducting research) 
Hungarian STI support 
schemes are open to non-
nationals, but funding is 
limited for them: foreign 
organisations are not 
entitled for Hungarian 
grants¸ foreign citizens 
obtaining a Hungarian 
mobility grant should carry 
out the supported research 
project at a Hungarian 
research unit, and the grant 
holder should be employed 
by that organisation 
* Ten calls were published in 2010-2011 under the priority axis of “Developing the content and 
organisation of higher education to create a knowledge-based economy” of the Social Renewal 
Operational Programme of the New Hungary Development Plan (2007-2013). This priority axis has two 
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major interventions: “Improving the quality of tertiary education in accordance with lifelong learning”; 
and “Expansion of the capacities of R&D&I&E [Research, Development, Innovation and Education] of 
tertiary education, thus supporting the enhancement of institutional cooperation with businesses”. All 
these schemes are co-financed by the EU Structural Funds, and thus have not been affected by the cuts in 
government funding for RTDI activities. 
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Annex: Alignment of national policies with ERA 
pillars/ objectives 
1. Ensure an adequate supply of human resources for research and an 
open, attractive and competitive single European labour market for 
male and female researchers 
1.1 Supply of human resources for research 
Despite the detrimental effects of the global economic crisis on the Hungarian economy 
in general, the number of researchers kept steadily increasing in 2008-2010 the total 
number of FTE researchers in Hungary grew from 17,391 in 2007 to 21,342 by 2010. 
(KSH) Thus, the share of researchers in total employment also grew from 0.44% in 2007 
to 0.59% in 2010. As already mentioned in section 1, the business enterprise sector 
became the largest employer of (FTE) researchers in 2006 (6,248 researchers, 35.5% of 
national total), and has kept that position since then (10,274 researchers, 48.1% of 
national total in 2010). In spite of the increased share of researchers in total 
employment, Hungary still lags behind the EU-27 average (0.72%). 
University enrolment data show that science and engineering are still not among the 
most popular career paths, and this has been identified as one of the key challenges of 
the Hungarian innovation system. (For data, see section 2.) 
Researcher mobility has been permanently at a low level, with regards to both inter-
sectoral and cross-border mobility. Hungary has one of the lowest shares of inward 
researcher mobility among the surveyed EU countries. (MORE, 2010, p. 35) 
International mobility of researchers has stagnated since 2006. The number of foreign 
researchers employed in Hungary was 630 in 2010, and accounted for only 3% of the 
total number of researchers. The vast majority (68%) of foreign researchers were EU 
citizens, and 16%-16% came from other European countries and other continents. An 
additional 196 foreign researchers stayed in Hungary for shorter periods as grant 
holders (as opposed to staff members), just over half of them from other EU countries. 
Outward mobility has also been relatively stable. In 2010, 398 Hungarian researchers 
stayed abroad for more than six months (of which 299 with employment contracts, the 
rest as grant holders). (KSH) Four hundred and fifty one foreign citizens were registered 
as PhD and DLA students at Hungarian HEIs in 2009/2010 (corresponding to 6.6% of all 
doctoral students), though the vast majority of them were Hungarians from 
neighbouring countries. (NEFMI, 2010, p. 148) 
Several STI policy measures promote inward and outward mobility, some of them 
directly, as their main objective. The Mobility scheme provides support to three target 
groups: (i) Hungarian researchers carrying out research at outstanding foreign research 
institutes or universities; (ii) foreign researchers coming to Hungary, (iii) Hungarian 
researchers currently working outside Europe returning to Hungary. 
1.2 Ensure that researchers across the EU benefit from open 
recruitment, adequate training, attractive career prospects and 
working conditions and barriers to cross-border mobility are 
removed 
The yearly wages of researchers in Hungary were below the EU25 average both in 
absolute (€15,812 vs. €37,948) and in PPS terms (€27,692 vs. €40,126) in 2006. (EC, 
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2007) Hungarian researchers’ ranking in terms of remuneration decreases along the 
career path among the 33 countries covered: Hungary ranks 20th in the group of 
researchers with 0-4 years of experience, and fall back to the 26th position for those with 
more than 15 years experience. Researchers in the private sector earn roughly 20-25% 
more than their colleagues working for PROs. 
The average net wage for employees performing “professional, scientific and 
engineering activities” was ~€698 (HUF192,061) a month in 2010. (KSH) 
The salaries of academic staff in the public research sector are determined by law, based 
on scientific seniority. On the basis of scientific performance, however, employers may 
provide supplementary salaries. Researchers’ additional income stems from various 
projects, or scholarship schemes. There are no readily available figures to assess the 
relative weight of these sources of income. In general, however, researchers employed in 
the public sector are modestly paid, and therefore (i) salaries are not the key motivating 
factor for pursuing a scientific career; (ii) it is a must to earn additional income from 
research and/or consultancy projects or even other (non-research) activities. 
Hungarian university-level graduates have the highest earnings advantage among OECD 
countries: those with below upper secondary qualifications earn 73% of national 
average, while those with tertiary education 217% of that.38 (OECD, 2007) 
Unemployment figures also show a much more favourable position compared to lower 
qualifications: 2.6% among ISCED 5-6 vs. 16% for ISCED 0-2 level. (KSH)39 This 
difference is smaller in many other countries. 
The demand for PhD degree holders is strongest in the HE sector.40 (Felvi, 2007) In 
general, the activities of doctoral schools are still not sufficiently aligned with the needs 
of businesses, given the lack of mutual understanding of each other’s activities. More 
than two-thirds of those holding a doctoral degree work in the public research sector. 
These findings, especially the need to improve dialogue between HEIs and the industry 
regarding the economic relevance of curricula, have also been stressed by the OECD’s 
Review of Innovation Policy in Hungary (OECD, 2008). 
Inward mobility is of almost negligible importance. As already mentioned, foreign 
researchers employed in Hungary accounted for only 3% of the total number of 
researchers. Most of them are likely to be of Hungarian origin from the neighbouring 
countries where overall working conditions and earnings are roughly at the same level 
or slightly less favourable. Regulation does not allow flexibility in wages paid by PROs, 
and hence researchers from countries with better working conditions and significantly 
higher salaries are not attracted to take up positions in Hungary. As for the private 
sector and private non-profit research organisations there are no such restrictions, it is 
up to their budget if they can pay higher wages for foreign researchers coming from 
more affluent countries. 
As of December 2011, 12 organisations have signed the Charter for Researchers: 9 HEIs, 
1 research centre at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, and 2 
private non-profit research centres. The National Office for Research and Technology 
promotes the uptake of the Charter. 
In general, research positions at public research institutes are open to non-nationals. In 
most cases, however, command of the Hungarian language is among the prerequisites. 
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 These data refer to the 25-64 years old age group of the population in 2004. 
39
 One also has to bear in mind that Hungarian employment rates are significantly below the EU 
average in all qualification groups. 
40
 The study was conducted by the National Higher Education Information Centre in 2002 and 2007, 
based on in-depth interviews and surveys, using a representative sample of degree holders. 
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That basically prevents foreign nationals from applying for these positions (except the 
ethnic Hungarians coming from neighbouring countries). 
The equivalence/ validation of foreign academic degrees, i.e. the recognition of foreign 
certificates and degrees are carried out by the Hungarian Equivalence and Information 
Centre (Hungarian ENIC, a member of the European Network of Information Centres) 
within the Educational Authority, while the nostrification of scientific degrees is done by 
the Hungarian higher education organisations. The only exception is the recognition of 
the foreign Candidate of Science and Doctor of Science degrees under international 
agreements.  
Just as in other new EU Member States, Hungarian research institutes advertise very few 
(a mere 6 in December 2011) vacancies (for researcher positions) on the EURAXESS 
website. 
Grants awarded by the various Hungarian research funding schemes are generally not 
transferable to other (national and foreign) research institutes. 
In sum, relatively low salaries, ‘patchy’ research infrastructures, and unsatisfactory 
overall working conditions generate brain-drain to foreign countries and professional 
shift to other, more attractive sectors in Hungary. 
1.3 Improve young people's scientific education and increase interest 
in research careers 
To pursue a research career is less attractive for young talents than becoming a 
professional (medical doctor, lawyer, manager in large public or private organisations, 
etc.), which can be achieved in many cases without a PhD degree, i.e. better paid jobs can 
be taken up even earlier, and thus life-time earnings would be definitely higher. Further, 
general working conditions for a researcher, e.g. access to funding, journals, books, and 
modern equipment – especially in the public sector – are not satisfactory, either. 
The impact of these unfavourable factors is reflected in the fact that while the number of 
graduates (ISCED 5-6) in mathematics, science and technology (per 1,000 people, aged 
20-29) has increased from 5.1 in 2004 to 7.5 by 2009, it was still well below the EU-27 
average (14.3 in 2009). (Eurostat) Brain-drain seems to be an important threat. Some 
125 thousand of Hungarians with tertiary education were living in OECD countries 
(outside Hungary) in the early 2000s, that is, a 14% migration rate among degree 
holders. One out of four S&E degree holders graduated in 1990-2000 left Hungary. 
(Csanády et al., 2008) 
Heated debates started again in 2010 if education curricula put too much emphasis on 
creativity, critical thinking, problem solving, teamwork, and communication skills at the 
expense of learning facts and memorisers, or on the contrary, more time and efforts 
should be devoted to develop these skills. The new Bill on Education, passed by the 
Parliament in December 2011, takes a conservative stance. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation management courses are widely available from 
private training companies, and also included in the curricula of some universities. 
1.4 Promote equal treatment for women and men in research 
The restoration of the same position after maternity leave is safeguarded by the general 
provisions of the Labour Code. However, the employer is not obliged to extend the 
employment period of a fixed-term contract. 
There are no specific provisions for female researchers. Gender quotas have been 
discussed in various areas in order to reduce the gap between the representation of men 
and women in various professions and bodies, but have not been introduced. 
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2. Facilitate cross-border cooperation, enhance merit-based 
competition and increase European coordination and integration of 
research funding 
Hungarian STI policies are designed through joint initiatives to a limited extent, and 
there has been no co-operation with other countries explicitly aimed at joint policy 
design. Hungarian partners are involved in several Joint Technology Initiatives (JTIs), 
such as ARTEMIS, ENIAC, and IMI, as well as in joint programmes: Eurostars and AAL. 
There has been an intention to participate in Joint Programming Initiatives, supported by 
preparatory activities via various ERA-NET projects. Further, Hungarian National 
Technology Platforms have co-operated with 24 European Technology Platforms in 
identifying their strategic research agendas, which – in principle – are to be considered 
when devising new STI policy measures. 
As to the delivery of these policies, most Hungarian support schemes are open to non-
nationals, and some of them, e.g. the second sub-programme of the “Mobility” scheme, 
explicitly identify foreign researchers as one of their target groups. In most cases, 
however, the supported research project should be carried out at a Hungarian facility 
(and the grant holder should be employed by that organisation). 
Foreign legal entities can join RTDI consortia co-financed by Hungarian STI policy 
schemes, but are not eligible for funding from Hungarian public money. As a general 
rule, Hungarian funding can be used abroad only by Hungarian researchers who are 
supported by a mobility scheme. 
Hungary holds the EUREKA chairmanship in July 2011 – June 2012; and the main 
priorities for this period are outlined in a 10-page work programme. Seventy-four 
EUREKA projects with Hungarian participants have been completed by June 2010, and as 
of early 2011 there were 24 on-going projects involving Hungarian participants, 
altogether 43 of them. Besides, Hungarian partners contribute to 5 strategic cluster 
projects. 
Hungarian researchers have been involved in 160 COST actions (as of February 2011),41 
and 51 ERA-NET projects by October 2011.42 
3. Develop world-class research infrastructures (including e-
infrastructures) and ensure access to them 
A strategy-building process was launched in 2008 to underpin policy proposals aimed at 
developing the R&D infrastructure, also emphasised by the National Lisbon Action Plan 
(2008-10). Its Hungarian acronym is NEKIFUT (“Take-off”), derived from Nemzeti 
Kutatási Infrastruktúra Felmérés és Útiterv (National Research Infrastructure Survey 
and Roadmap). It would suggest a roadmap for building new RIs and upgrading existing 
ones in Hungary, as well as those areas of specialisation where participation in new 
transnational infrastructures is favourable. 
The project – devising and following a very detailed assessment method, relying on a 
two-round on-line survey to collect data from individual RIs – has identified some 80 
Hungarian RIs of strategic relevance (strategic RI, in short). Given the strict assessment 
criteria, altogether hundreds of RIs have formed networks to be qualified as strategic 
RIs. Hence, the ~80 strategic RIs are actually composed of over 400 individual RIs. 
                                                        
41
 The complete list, the distribution of actions by fields, and data on Hungarian participation in 
previous years can be accessed at the NIH website. 
42
 A full list can be accessed at the netwach website. 
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These strategic RIs have been selected from all fields of sciences: physical and 
engineering sciences, life sciences, as well as social sciences and humanities. A web-
based, bi-lingual register presents all the relevant data of these RIs for potential users 
and co-operation partners, while other types of data pertinent to STI policy-makers are 
available only for them. 
NEKIFUT had been mainly financed from the Research and Technological Innovation 
Fund until June 2010. As already mentioned, unused funds were frozen by the incoming 
government in June 2010, and thus a new decision is needed if the project is to be 
completed, i.e. to update the register – updating would be crucial in 2012 as most of the 
formerly independent institutes of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences are going to be 
merged into research centres in January 2012 –, and devise the RI development 
roadmap (covering both national and transnational RIs). As of December 2011, there 
was no decision on the completion of the NEKIFUT project, although it was presented to 
the EU Competitiveness Council in April of 2011. 
So far Hungary has chosen to participate in two RIs listed on the ESFRI roadmap: XFEL 
with 1% of the total budget, around €1.0-1.5m in the construction phase; ELI with 
around €3.5m allocated for the preparatory phase to host one ELI site in Hungary. 
Besides, several Hungarian research units have expressed their interest to participate in 
over a dozen ESFRI projects, in which cases RIs are (or would be) located in other EU 
countries. 
Hungary has joined several inter-governmental agreements, organisations and large RIs, 
including EMBO, European Molecular Biology Organization; GMES, Global Monitoring for 
Environment and Security; EFDA, The European Fusion Development Agreement; ESA, 
European Space Agency (as an observer); CERN, European Organization of Nuclear 
Research; ITER, International Fusion Energy Organisation; ECMWF, European Centre for 
Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (as observer); EUMETSAT, European Organisation 
for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites; ESRF, European Synchroton Radiation 
Facility; ILL- Institut Laue-Langevin: Neutrons for Science. 
Given the size and level of economic development of the country, not much funding is 
available to invest in expensive research infrastructure (RI), roughly €100m a year. Only 
a small fraction of the Hungarian RIs can be regarded as large RIs, mainly in physics. The 
best known example is the research reactor operated by the Atomic Energy Research 
Institute (MTA), open to the international research community. 
All strategic RIs identified by the NEKIFUT project are open to the entire research 
community: openness has been one of the selection criteria. The web-based register 
provides data on these RIs in English in order to promote their use by foreign 
researchers. 
4. Strengthen research organisations, including notably universities 
The autonomy of higher education and scientific research is one of the key principles of 
the Hungarian legal framework, entrenched in the Constitution,43 as well as in the Law 
on Higher Education, which stipulates that “the freedom of teaching, research and 
artistic creation shall be maintained by means of the autonomy of higher education 
institutions”. This general principle applies to all three aspects of autonomy, namely 
“academic”, “political” and “financial/ managerial”, within certain boundaries defined by 
the law. In particular, HEIs have a high degree of autonomy in the selection of candidates 
for academic positions by the governing bodies of the HEI, in devising their curricula and 
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 This stipulation of the Constitution is taken as an absolute principle, overriding any other initiatives: 
see below the case of the Economic Councils, proposed by the Law on Higher Education (2005). 
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research agendas/ strategies, and budgeting processes (infrastructure development, 
tuition fees, etc.). However, a number of legal requirements, e.g. pertaining to wages of 
public servants, limit HEIs’ autonomy. Asset management is also strictly regulated by 
law. Promotion of university staff is decided internally, while professorships are 
formally awarded by the President of the Republic. Salaries of academic staff are also 
determined by law, with some room for performance-based complementary payments. 
The Law on Higher Education (2005) introduced a number of amendments aimed at 
modernising university governance structures (e.g. involving businesses in HEIs’ 
governing bodies), while keeping the autonomy of HEIs as a key principle. The Rector, as 
head of the HEI, has remained the academic leader. The Law stipulates that eligible 
candidates for rector are university professors. The majority of universities apply open 
tender processes, while some only allow tenured professors to apply. In any case, due to 
the stipulation of the Law, rectors (and deans) are exclusively academics, chosen by the 
universities’ Senate, and finally approved by the President of the Republic. Even in the 
case of open tenders, most rectors tend to be chosen from within own ranks of 
universities. 
The 2005 Law introduced two new governing bodies: the Senate and the Economic 
Council. The Senate oversees all aspects of the operation of a given HEI: approves a 
Development Plan, devises, and implements RTDI strategies. It is composed of mainly 
academics, but also other employees of the HEI and student representatives. The 
Economic Council was originally supposed to make financial decisions and to supervise 
their implementation. Three members of these councils (composed of 7 or 9 members in 
total) are delegated by the government, and thus these provisions were declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. The Economic Councils, therefore, only 
have an advisory and monitoring role. For publicly financed HEIs it is compulsory to set 
up an Economic Council, while it is optional for private ones. The members nominated 
by the (then) Minister of Education and Culture are typically non-academics (e.g. 
businessmen and financial experts), as are often the ones appointed by the Senate. The 
role played by the Economic Councils at the different universities varies considerably: 
while some are rather active and have a significant influence on strategic decisions, in 
most cases they remain formal consultative bodies. 
In sum, universities have a high degree of autonomy in determining research topics and 
allocating budgets. These decisions, in turn, remain in the hands of academics. 
Traditionally, the main mission of the Hungary HE education sector focussed more on 
teaching than on research activities. Apart from a few large and prestigious universities 
(and especially their certain faculties and institutes), which carry out the bulk of HERD, 
the large majority of smaller universities and colleges (especially in the countryside) 
have negligible R&D activities. The mission statements of the larger universities stress 
the importance of both multidisciplinary education and R&D of the highest quality 
according to international standards.44 
The Hungarian HE landscape is characterised by a wide gap between a number of 
relatively competitive and traditionally “elite” universities (which nevertheless have 
also undergone the effects of the transition to mass education), and a large number of 
lower quality, less competitive colleges, especially in smaller towns of the country.45 
                                                        
44
 This group of universities include e.g. the Budapest University of Technology and Economics [BME], 
University of Debrecen [DE], Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences [ELTE], Semmelweis University 
[SOTE], University of Szeged [SZTE]. 
45
 To illustrate this point – and leaving aside the pros and cons of various university ranking methods/ 
exercises, only two Hungarian universities appear in the top 500 ones identified by the Leiden ranking: 
University of Szeged [SZTE] (388), and Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences [ELTE] (406). (This 
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In general, the access procedures at the Hungarian HEIs are competitive. However, there 
are significant differences among the Hungarian HEIs in this respect, too: a few of them 
enjoy a high esteem among the future employers, and thus it is markedly more difficult 
to enter those HEIs, compared to those, which are less popular among the students, 
given the less promising employment prospective they offer. 
As for funding research activities of HEIs, there are two main channels: core (block) 
funding for RTDI, and project-based competitive funding. In line with the stipulations of 
the Law on Higher Education (2005), the so-called “scientific appropriation” (basically 
grants for the purpose of scientific activities of HEIs, including post-graduate education) 
is based on the number of full-time professors, the number of professors holding 
scientific degrees, PhD students and PhD graduates. Neither publication and citation 
performance, nor patent applications per grants indices are used as evaluation criteria. 
HEIs are entitled to distribute the funds among faculties or research groups 
autonomously, and they occasionally apply performance criteria (such as bibliometric 
indicators or external funding generated by the respective unit). The use of the block 
funds are not followed closely, i.e. they can be used for financing education activities or 
covering general costs, such as heating and lighting. 
An implicit general “external” assessment exercise by the government was launched in 
2007. Since then, a HEI may receive additional public funding in case it enters a so-called 
three-year maintaining agreement with the (then) Ministry of Education and Culture. 
Based on the agreement, the Ministry can monitor (and assess) capabilities of a given HE 
organisation for setting and performing strategic targets in various fields during the 
contracted 3 years. A detailed list of measures for monitoring and assessment include 
alternative indicators regarding all three aspects of universities’ missions, namely “basic 
activity (Education and Research)”, “supporting activity (guiding and management and 
collaboration and co-operation)”, and “Social linkages (regional role and participation in 
performing social targets)”. The HEIs had to select relevant indicators, set targets in 
each of these obligatory fields, and elaborate these in their so-called “Institutional 
Development Plans” (i.e. strategic documents), which can be monitored during the 
three-year period and evaluated at the end. 
There are a number of national ranking exercises, mostly carried out by prestigious 
weekly newspapers. These rankings of universities, their faculties, and degree 
programmes are based on significantly diverging methods. Therefore, their results are 
ambiguous and are not used as a basis for national funding. However, they are important 
sources of information for both employers and secondary school graduates for selection. 
5. Facilitate partnerships and productive interactions between 
research institutes and the private sector 
Several STI policy measures have been launched to foster RTDI co-operation in Hungary. 
As discussed in Section 3.3 in relation to the specific “policy routes”, many schemes 
supporting private sector RTDI activities give preference to, or require mandatory, co-
operation between private and public sector organisations with the aim of facilitating 
knowledge circulation (including mobility of researchers) and the exploitation of 
research results. Furthermore, a number of schemes are in place with the primary 
objective of facilitating collaborative RTDI. The most important policy development in 
this respect has been the financing of joint university-industry research centres. There 
are 38 such centres, each located at a university. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ranking has been calculated by using the mean citation score indicator, and non-English language 
publications have been included; http://www.leidenranking.com/ranking.aspx) 
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Schemes funded by EU cohesion policy, i.e. the Structural Funds have also been 
important vehicles for fostering knowledge transfer through the creation and 
development of incubators and science parks in Hungary. The Economic Development 
Operational Programme of the New Hungary Development Plan (2007-2013) included 
such measures, e.g. the “Promotion of Technology and Innovation Parks”. Furthermore, 
most of the seven Regional Operational Programmes include measures for supporting 
technology parks and/or business incubation. 
As already noted, the evaluation report on the operation of the Research and 
Technological Innovation Fund, claims that industry-academia collaboration has 
improved over the period of 2004-2009 (Ernst & Young and GKI, 2010b). 
Attempts have also been made to create a more favourable regulatory environment and 
incentives for PROs to accelerate their IPR activities and produce exploitable knowledge. 
The Law on Research and Technological Innovation (effective as of 2005) has 
introduced the notion of spin-offs into the regulatory framework. Publicly financed HEIs 
and PROS (henceforth, publicly financed research units) are obliged to have their own 
internal regulation on IPR issues (since 2006), which contains instructions on valuation, 
reporting, rights and obligations, as well as levels of responsibility, and devise an IPR 
management strategy. Furthermore, in order to be eligible for funding, beneficiaries of 
the Research and Technological Innovation Fund are obliged to submit the applicable 
IPR rules (regarding IPR utilisation and procedures, researcher motivation, licensing) to 
the funding agency. The National Office for Research and Technology, in co-operation 
with the Hungarian Patent Office and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences devised 
guidelines, which the individual organisations could (and in most cases did) use as a 
blueprint.  
Technology transfer offices have been established by almost all state universities, 
relying on support schemes. Some of them are part of the university’s organisation (e.g. 
at the University of Debrecen it is supervised by the Rector), whereas in other cases 
these tasks are carried out by an organisation set up jointly by the university and a 
number of other regional players, such as PROs and regional authorities (e.g. Biopolisz 
in the case of the Univ. Szeged).  
In order to facilitate the establishment of spin-offs, the Parliament amended the Law on 
Higher Education in June 2007. From September 1, 2007 higher education institutes can 
establish business entities for commercialising their intellectual assets without any 
formal consent of government authorities. The Act CVI. of 2007 (25 September) on State 
Property amends the Law on Research and Technological Innovation: it stipulates that, 
as opposed to the general regulations of the Act, publicly financed research units shall be 
the owners of acquired IPR and be entitled to a share of the spin-off firm emanating 
from it. IPR regulation has become more favourable for the exploitation of R&D results 
by giving property rights to the publicly financed research units and by allowing the 
establishment of business entities (spin-offs) for the commercialisation of HEIs’ 
intellectual assets. 
Inter-sectoral mobility of Hungarian researchers has been identified as one of the key 
weaknesses of the Hungarian STI system. Only 6% of Hungarian researchers at HEIs had 
previously been employed in both the private and the public sector, which is roughly 
one third of the EU-27 average. (MORE Report, 2010, p. 71) This is probably strongly 
related to the structural/ institutional characteristics of the Hungarian public research 
sector: the overwhelming majority of Hungarian researchers (85% vs. 59% EU-27 
average) at HEIs are employed under open-ended contracts, and that 70% of them have 
been employed by their principal employer for more than 10 years. (MORE Report, 
2010, p. 55) The administrative framework is not prohibitive in this respect, but does 
COUNTRY REPORTS 2011: HUNGARY 
Page 38  
not provide incentives, either. Researchers in the public sector are relatively well 
protected by law, however, are not particularly well paid. The low level of mobility can 
probably be better explained by the relatively low level of interaction between the 
sectors in general and as a consequence of the diverging incentive structures. 
As mentioned in section 4 of this Annex, businesses have been involved in the 
governance of universities to a limited extent. Publicly financed HEIs must set up an 
Economic Council, while it is optional for private ones. The members of these Councils 
are typically non-academics (e.g. business people and financial experts). Economic 
Councils have an advisory role at some universities varies are rather active and have a 
significant influence on strategic decisions, in most cases they remain formal 
consultative bodies. 
6. Enhance knowledge circulation across Europe and beyond 
As detailed in Section 2 of this Annex, Hungarian researchers are involved in joint 
programmes, EUREKA, COST, and ERA-NET projects. The “Institutional Strategy” of the 
NKTH declared that joining these community initiatives is a “strategic interest”, and the 
participation of industrial players should be promoted in order to efficiently exploit the 
opportunities provided by these collaborative projects. (NKTH, 2007) Several schemes 
support Hungarian participation in these initiatives, while conferences, information 
days and other similar events are also organised by the NKTH [renamed as NIH since 
January 2011] to raise awareness. 
Hungarian researchers intend to contribute to the development of a sustainable, 
efficient, and effective European scientific information system via ESFRI initiatives 
(developing e-infrastructures in all various fields of science). Support to these efforts at 
this stage – until a national RI development strategy is completed – can only be obtained 
via one-off decisions, i.e. not in the framework of a dedicated scheme. 
There are no specific Hungarian policy measures aimed at enhancing open circulation of 
knowledge across national borders and open access to research outputs (publications 
and data) by researchers and society at large. 
7. Strengthen international cooperation in science and technology and 
the role and attractiveness of European research in the world 
There were 35 bilateral STI co-operation agreements in force in 2011. In addition to the 
EU members, the partners include (a) leading countries in S&T, e.g. the USA, Israel, 
Japan; (b) the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, India, Russia, China), which are globally 
perceived as emerging S&T players; as well as (c) developing countries in various 
continents, e.g. Argentina, Egypt and Vietnam. The primary objective of these 
agreements is to promote mobility and international co-operation, and organising S&T 
seminars and workshops. 
In most cases grants can be used to cover travel and subsistence costs. Full costs of 
bilateral collaborative projects are covered in the case of five countries, with which co-
funding agreements have been signed. Four of these countries are non-ERA countries: 
China (technologies supporting competitiveness and sustainable development), India, 
Israel (industrial technologies) and Singapore (medical instruments, bioinformatics, life 
sciences, pharmaceuticals, and related chemical research). 
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List of Abbreviations 
BERD Business Expenditures for Research and Development 
BME Budapest University of Technology and Economics 
BRIC Brazil, India, Russia, China 
CERN European Organisation for Nuclear Research 
CIS Community Innovation Survey 
COST European Cooperation in Science and Technology 
ECMWF European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts 
EDOP Economic Development Operational Programme 
EIS European Innovation Scoreboard 
ELTE Eotvos Lorand University of Sciences 
ENIAC European Nanoelectronics Initiative Advisory Council 
ERA European Research Area 
ERA-NET European Research Area Network 
ERP Fund European Recovery Programme Fund 
ESA European Space Agency 
ESFRI European Strategy Forum on Research Infrastructures 
EU European Union 
EU-27 European Union including 27 Member States 
EUMETSAT European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
FDI Foreign Direct Investments 
FP European Framework Programme for Research and Technology 
Development 
FP Framework Programme 
FP7 7th Framework Programme 
FTE Full-time equivalent 
GBAORD Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GERD Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D 
GOVERD Government Intramural Expenditure on R&D 
GUF General University Funds 
HERD Higher Education Expenditure on R&D 
HES Higher education sector 
HUF Hungarian forint 
IMI Innovative Medicine Initiative 
IP Intellectual Property 
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education 
ITER International Fusion Energy Organisation 
IU SAT Innovation Union self-assessment tool  
JTI Joint Technology Initiative 
KSH Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
PRO Public Research Organisations 
MISz Hungarian Association of Innovation 
MORE Mobility of Researhers 
MTA Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
NEKIFUT National Research Infrastructure Survey and Roadmap 
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NEFMI Ministry of National Resources 
NIH National Innovation Office 
NIS National Innovation System 
NKITT National Research, Innovation and Science Policy Council  
NKTH National Office for Research and Technology 
NRP National Reform Programme 
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OP Operational Programme 
OTKA National Scientific Research Fund 
PPS Purchasing power standard 
PRO Public Research Organisation 
R&D Research and development 
R&D&I Research and Development and Innovation 
RI Research Infrastructures 
RTDI Research Technological Development and Innovation 
RTIF Research and Technological Innovation Fund 
S&E Science and engineering 
S&T Science and technology 
SF Structural Funds 
SME Small and Medium Sized Enterprise 
SOTE Semmelweis University 
SF Structural Funds 
STI Science, technology and innovation 
SZTE University of Szeged 
TTPK Science and Technology Policy Council  
VC Venture Capital 
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Abstract 
The main objective of the ERAWATCH Annual Country Reports is to characterise and assess the performance of national 
research systems and related policies in a structured manner that is comparable across countries. EW Country Reports 
2011 identify the structural challenges faced by national innovation systems. They further analyse and assess the ability of 
the policy mix in place to consistently and efficiently tackle these challenges. The annex of the reports gives an overview of 
the latest national policy efforts towards the enhancement of European Research Area and further assess their efficiency to 
achieve the targets.  
 
These  reports  were originally produced in November - December 2011, focusing on policy developments  over  the 
previous twelve months.  The reports were produced by the ERAWATCH Network under contract to JRC-IPTS. The 
analytical framework and the structure of the reports have been developed by the  Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies of the Joint Research Centre (JRC-IPTS)  and Directorate General for Research and Innovation  with contributions 
from ERAWATCH Network Asbl. 
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As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU 
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole 
policy cycle. 
 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal 
challenges while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, 
and sharing and transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and 
food security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and 
security including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach. 
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